Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism\u27s Purpose, The by Christofferson, Jay A.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3 Article 5
1-1-1998
Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting
Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding
Federalism's Purpose, The
Jay A. Christofferson
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay A. Christofferson, Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism's Purpose, The,
29 McGeorge L. Rev. 351 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol29/iss3/5
The Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting Contractual
Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism's Purpose
Jay A. Christofferson"
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the power to control all activities that impact foreign countries, even if
just tangentially, reside uniquely with the national government?' It once was
repeated as mantra by jurists, "The states are unknown to foreign nations."2 Now
state3 governments unsheepishly enact legislation which intends, or which sym-
bolically manifests a desire, to have foreign nations understand that their practices
do not go unnoticed and can serve as the impetus to spur states to act. Naturally,
state officials attuned to the desires of their respective constituents are not interested
in committing political hara-kiri by discounting popular causes.5 With this under-
standing, state authorities have overtly restricted commercial intercourse,6 divested
* J.D. to be conferred 1999, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; M.S., History,
University of Utah, 1995; B.A., History, B.A., Political Science, California State University, Santa Barbara, 1992.
1. See generally Richard Bilder The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM.J.INT'WLL. 821
(1989) (synthesizing diverse material including the Federalist papers and modem academic articles in assessing the
viability of state and local activities with potential foreign affairs ramifications).
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
3. This note uses "state" to refer to both state and municipal action unless otherwise indicated. See
GEOFFREYSTONEETAL., CONSTItrnUONALLAW 332 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 211 (1984), "A municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State from which
its authority derives.").
4. See Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign
Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563, 564 n.1 (1993) (cataloging a panoply of non-federal
laws, including:
- 900 localities, passing resolutions supporting a freeze in the arms race;
- 197 localities demanding a halt to nuclear testing;
- 120 localities refusing to cooperate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's nuclear
war exercises;
- 126 localities, plus 27 states, divesting more than $20 billion from firms doing business in South
Africa;
- 86 localities forming linkages with Nicaragua to off-set aid supplied to the Contras by the federal
government;
- 73 localities forming sister-city relationships with Soviet cities; and
- 10 localities establishing funded offices of international affairs;
see also FLA. ST. ANN. § 205.0532 (West Supp.1997) (providing that any local governing authority issuing an
occupational license to any individual, business or entity, or parent company may revoke or refuse to renew such
license if the individual, business or entity is doing business with Cuba).
5. Fenton, supra note 4, at 590.
6. See Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action As an Intrusion Upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 813-14 n.5 (1986) (elucidating that state governments implemented
"communist goods" ordinances in the 1960's restricting Eastern Bloc products by imposing various discriminatory
licensing and notice requirements on their sale).
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funds from nations guilty of human rights violations, 7 acted as the catalyst for
federal legislation," and also exercised their freedom of expression to satisfy
popular demand.9 More recent forays into what have previously been, uniquely
federal controlled areas include enacting nuclear free zones 0 and "buy American
statutes."" Despite the proliferation of these laws and the proliferation of activity
7. See Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa: The Lifting of the ComprehensiveAnti-
ApartheidActof.1986andthe Continuing Validity of State and LocalAnti-Apartheid Legislation, 6 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 7, 8-11 (1990) (discussing the relationship between state divestment strategies and national policies removing
money invested in banks and businesses in South Africa to induce Pretoria to modify its behavior toward the black
majority).
8. See Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FOREIGN POL'Y
158, 159 (1992) (documenting that local initiatives provided the impetus for the Reagan administration to begin
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiations, to stop aiding the Contras, and to abandon most of its nuclear-
war civil defense planning).
9. See Spiro, supra note 6, at 814 nn.6-7 (analyzing various state practices to register state opinions
concerning various foreign affairs issues which include New York City Council's move to rename an intersection
near the former Soviet Union's United Nations mission as "Sakarov-Bonner Comer" to show solidarity with the
famous dissident's plight and the actions by the governors of New York and New Jersey to deny landing rights to
the plane of Andrei Gromyko, then-foreign minister of the Soviet Union, to protest the downing of Korean Airlines
007, killing hundreds onboard); see also Bilder, supra note 1, at 822 n.7 (discussing Tayyari v. New Mex. State
Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D. N.M. 1980), in which university regents, in protest of the American hostages held in
Iran, denied admission to students whose home governments held, or permitted the holding of, U.S. citizens as
hostages).
10. See generally United States v. City of Oakland, 958 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1992) (striking down Oakland's
nuclear-free zone ordinance because it was "so comprehensive, so complete, so all-encompassing that it cannot help
but conflict with the rights and authority of the federal government"). Compare Luis Li, State Sovereignty and
Nuclear Free Zones, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1171-72 (1991) (positing that city nuclear free zones-prohibiting the
manufacture or transportation of nuclear weapons and weapons parts within their borders-survive constitutional
evaluation because they fall within the strictures of the United States Constitutional allotment of control over local
police powers), with Teresa A. Otruba, Comment, Local Nuclear-Free Zone Legislation: Force of Law or
Expressions of Political Sentiment?, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (1988) (concluding that, as presently
constituted, nuclear-free zone statutes fail constitutional scrutiny because of their interference with the Federal
government's foreign affairs policy).
11. See generally Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that
Pennsylvania's "Buy American" statute was constitutional because the state acted as a participant, not a regulator,
and thus did not violate the Commerce Clause and also concluding that the statute had only indirect impacts on
foreign commerce, immunizing it against a foreign affairs challenge); K.S.B. Technical Sales v. North Jersey Dist.
Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (NJ. 1977) (determining that states' statutes favoring American producers
constitutes valid state action). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 800 (1969) (striking down a California statute requiring public works to buy American products). Compare
Grace A. Jubinsky, Note, State and Municipal Governments ReactAgainst South African Apartheid: An Assessment
of the Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CiN. L. REV. 543, 561 n.103 (1985) (finding the laws
symmetrical with the market participant doctrine, as the state could only purchase American products and the anti-
apartheid statute roughly approximates the federal buy-American statute, thereby reinforcing federal uniformity),
and Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation,
61 TUL L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1987) (discussing the constitutionality of various state laws divesting funds from
South Africa), with Geraldo Pascual, Note, State BuyAmerican Laws InA World of Liberal Trade, 7 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 311, 311-12 (1992) (determining that decisions validating state buy-American statutes inadequately assess the
impact the laws have on international trade and national agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GAT); Note, State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State Attempts to FavorAmerican Producers,
64 MINN. L. REv. 389, 392, 412 (1980) (illustrating that state buy-American statutes cause a lack of national
uniformity and violate GATIT's strictures).
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by states in "quasi-foreign affairs," the laws have occasioned a dearth of discus-
sion in Congress1 2 and inspired few legal battles. 3 One commentator concludes that
inactivity by the federal government serves as benign neglect to protect the
equipoise of federalism by not foreclosing states' ability to engage in activity to
enhance meaningful and responsive local government.1
4
In a showing of distaste for the egregious treatment doled out to political
dissidents in Burma,t5 state t6 and municipal governments 7 have adopted laws
prohibiting government contracts with Burma directly or indirectly with companies
that have dealings with Burma. 8 Many other states are contemplating enacting
similar legislation. 9 This comment assesses the constitutionality of these measures
12, See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (West 1989) (declining to preempt existing state legislation
divesting funds from South Africa).
13. See generally Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (111. 1986) (determining
that an Illinois statute that imposed discriminatory taxes on South African Kruggerands, but exempted gold coins
from the United States and other nations, was an unconstitutional restraint on trade); Board of Trustees v. Mayor
of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (holding that Maryland's divestment from apartheid South Africa
statute passed constitutional muster despite the panoply of constitutional arguments).
14. See, e.g., David E. Dreifke, The Foreign Commerce Clause and the Market Participant Exception, 25
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 288-89 (1992) (noting that states act as laboratories of experiment thereby allowing
responsive local government and greater sensitivity to local concerns to which the federal government does not as
effectively cater).
15. See Rudy Guyon, Comment Violent Repression In Burma: Human Rights and the Global Response, 10
UCLA PAC. BASINL.J. 409, 410 n.1 (1991) (detailing that, while respecting a people's right to name their country
in any manner they choose, and in solidarity with the repressed majority, the country will be referred to as Burma,
and not by their official name Myanmar). This paper, too, utilizes the name Burma and not Myanmar. One good
reason for this decision is that Congressional legislation and one Presidential order refer to "prohibiting new
investment in Burma." Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009;
Executive Order No. 13047,62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (1997); see also Estelina Dallet & Seth Rosenthal, Human Rights
Issues in United States Foreign Policy, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 117, 117 (1991) (detailing the pervasive bloodshed
and internecine conflict among the hill tribes promoted by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
the military junta controlling Burma).
16. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22 H, J (West Supp. 1997) (proscribing new state contracts with
Burma or providing goods or services to the government of Burma).
17. See David Usborne, Boston Takes on the EU Over Burma Trade; City Hall Against the World: Local
Governments Confront Nation States, Corporations, and Trade Blocs, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 12, 1997, at 9
(explaining that 10 cities, including San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley, had passed selective procurement laws
designed to punish companies with operations in Burma by circumscribing all future contractual relations); see also
Paul Reines, Takoma Park Takes Global View with Burma-Related Ban, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at All
(calling attention to the mushrooming of state selective contract laws).
18. See Tiffany Danitz, Senate May Follow State, City Actions to Punish Burma, WASH. TIMES, May 4,
1995, at A20 (revealing that Berkeley has joined other cities in passing legislation banning contracts with
companies doing business with Burma, following its own lead in being the first city to pass an anti-apartheid bill
against South Africa).
19. See, e.g., CAL AB 888 1997 (authorizing the prohibition of state government contracts with companies
that are doing business with Burma); CoLO. S.R. 5 1997 (same); CONN. HB 6354 1997 (same); N.C. SB 1067 1997
(same); TEX. HB 2960 1997 (same); see also Reines, supra note 17, at Al1 (reporting that the cities of Ann Arbor,
Mich., Madison, Wis., and Santa Monica, Cal., have adopted measures expressing disapproval of the Burmese
regime, and noting that New York City will purportedly consider a similar measure); Denis Collins, What More
Reason Needed For Sanctions Against Burma, WISCONSIN ST. J. (Madison), Jan. 5, 1997, at 2B (imploring the
University of Wisconsin to cut ties with Burma and categorically listing the reasons to initiate sanctions against
1998 / Constitutionality of State Laws
under several provisions of the United States Constitution. Part II of this comment
reviews the language and purpose of several of these statutes and ordinances. Part
III reviews the importance of the First Amendment in protecting discourse between
the two levels of government-state and federal. In Part IV, these statutes are
analyzed in connection with the preemption doctrine. Part V considers the viability
of these statutes under the rubric of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Part VI focuses
on the relationship of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause and the potential effect
these statutes could have on foreign affairs. These sections will also include con-
siderations of the purposes of federalism and the interplay of state actors with the
federal government. Part VII will concentrate on the importance of federalism in
protecting state activity that influences decisions rendered in Washington and
boardrooms all over the world. In essence, this piece proposes that selective con-
tract laws are constitutional and embody democratic decisions fostering observance
of international human rights and the tenets of federalism by utilizing the
quintessential First Amendment speech right: to voice opinions to influence policy-
makers.20 In a less abstract way, the laws also exemplify the pithy, yet poignant,
bumpersticker rally, which calls on people to "think globally and act locally."
II. STATE SELECTIVE CONTRACT LAWS
The brutality of Tienamen Square captured the attention of the American public
and spurred world condemnation, but the bloodshed in Burma has easily exceeded
that of Tienamen Square ten-fold.2' Burma, as opposed to other international human
rights violators, has received greater world media attention because of the plight of
Aung San Suu Kyi and her heroic stand against the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), the military government of Burma, and the subsequent world
acknowledgment of her efforts particularly through her receipt of the Nobel Peace
Prize.22 Congress criticized the human rights violations and passed concurrent
Burma, including: the political oppression of the native populace, the drug trade, forced labor, and other human
rights violations).
20. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 176 (detailing that the First Amendment guarantees the rights of all
citizens, including governors, mayors, and their employees, to speak out on national foreign policy); see also
Dreifke, supra note 14, at 289 (noting the meaningful and responsive local government, including increased
participatory democracy).
21. See Dana Rohrabacher, The United States Should Put its Legislation Where Its Ideals Are for Burmese
Democracy Movement, ROLLCALLAssoc., (Sacramento), July 29, 1996, at 1-2 (aligning with other representatives
in the California Assembly to highlight the atrocities effectuated by the SLORC against dissident groups and the
inordinate loss of life and continued repression experienced in Burma); see also Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean,
A BoycortforBurma-the South Africa of the 90's, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1996, at A23 (detailing the variegated
political problems and pervasive bloodshed within Burma, and noting that thousands of peaceful protesters were
publicly and privately massacred in Burma during 1988).
22. See Rachel Gordon, Burma Debate Leaves Airport Deal Up in the Air, Firms' Bids for Big Contract
Hampered By Alleged Ties to Asian Nation, S.F. EXAMnER, Dec. 12, 1996, at A-26 (discussing the willingness
of San Francisco to sever all ties with companies economically engaged in Burma because of the recent publicizing
of human rights violations); see also Bernstein & Kean, supra note 21 at A23 (noting Aung San Suu Kyi's long
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resolutions condemning SLORC for those violations.23 However, due to strategic
alliances, trade, reelection pressures, and global politics, Congress has acted
cautiously in implementing sanctions against Burma.24 In the wake of Congress's
incomplete response, state acts have proliferated.2 As Burma does not have a
monopoly on brutalizing a native populace, many state actions also target other
nations violating human rights.26
Some commentators contend that these laws have excellent "risk-opportunity"
ratios for local politicians because the laws "draw the attention of the local press,
are more substantive than adoption of precatory resolution of censure and dis-
approval, and present little economic risk to the jurisdiction.' '27 Another purported
strike against the debarment, or selective contract, laws emphasizes that the with-
drawal of American companies will only allow foreign competition to fill the void
without bringing any pressure to bear on SLORC.28 Debarring contracts from just
in house arrest).
23. See Dallett & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 124 nn.65-67 (cataloging various Congressional efforts to
condemn SLORC's human rights violations).
24. See David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the
United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 186-87 (noting
that Congress has chosen constructive engagement over complete withdrawal); see also Dallett & Rosenthal, supra
note 15, at 125 (urging the Bush administration to isolate Burma and discourage private investment there); Matt
Miller, Pipeline of Controversy: Unocal Called to Court by Opponents of Burma Regime, COPLEY NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 10, 1996, (reporting that "The Clinton administration has so far resisted stiffer penalties, saying that it
wouldn't be effective and that Asian-led products would replace American investment.").
25. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 180 n.15 (listing several city selective contract provisions
including:
Ann Arbor, Mich., Resolution Barring Purchases from Businesses in Burma and from Those Doing
Business with Burma (Myanmar) (Apr. 15, 1996); Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57,881-N.S., III.B.
and IV.B. (Feb. 28,1995); Carborro, N.C., Resolution Barring Purchases from Businesses in Burma and
From Those Doing Business with Burma, Resolution No. 18/96-97 (Oct. 8, 1996); Madison, Wis.,
Resolution No. 52471, I.D. No.-17607 (Aug. 15, 1995); Oakland, Cal., Selective Purchasing Law; San
Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code 12J.1 (1996); Santa Monica, Cal., Selective Purchasing Ordinance,
Resolution No. 8966 (Nov. 38, 1995); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28. 1996)).
Id.
26. See Rachel Gordon, Supes Defend, Expand Burma Ban; Amos Brown Wants 5 More Countries On
Enemies List, S.F. EXAMINER, June 17, 1997, at Al (reporting that San Francisco, CA, has contemplated applying
state contracting moratoriums against African nations violating human rights); John Nichols, City Bans Sweatshop
Products; No Municipal Purchases of Such Products by Off icials in North Olmstead, OH. Allowed, PROGRESSIVE
(Cleveland) May 20, 1997, at 14 (assessing North Olmstead's selective-purchasing law that prevents the city from
purchasing products made in sweatshops, including products made in the United States); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4798 (West 1986) (passing state authority to municipalities to adopt ordinances to prohibit the sale and
offering for sale of products manufactured or produced in any Communist country, including North Korea, Red
China, and Bulgaria).
27. Fenton, supra note 4, at 590; see also Eric Altbach, USTR To DefendMassachusetts'Burma Law, JAPAN
ECON. INST. RPT., Aug. 22, 1997 (quoting Byron Rushing (D.-Boston). as stating that "Massachusetts would enjoy
a good run-in with the State Department," and adding that state legislators have enjoyed the favorable publicity they
have gotten in their home state for passing and defending the law); Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 186
(noting that legislators can profit at the polls by supporting local measures).
28. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 203-04 (discussing the economic disadvantages American
companies will experience by pulling out of Burma, and the minimal tangible gains these withdrawals will reap).
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one nation seem incongruous when considering American economic dealings with
other dictatorial regimes.29
Notwithstanding the purported limited political risk and negligible gain
evinced by these laws, the state acts in question reflect the essential workings of the
democratic process: passing legislation via popularly elected officials held
accountable to their respective electorates.3" Furthermore, in governing their affairs,
states historically have indirectly impinged on American foreign relations through
taxing of international goods within theirborders, regulating the admission of aliens
-including, for instance, Florida's headline grabbing decision to refuse the
admittance of the Cuban and Haitian flotillas-and determining to apply state or
foreign law to an international transaction.3 Moreover, the questioned state laws
focus on all companies, foreign and domestic, that do business in Burma, thereby
making contract decisions, not foreign policy decisions, similar to state laws
restricting government contracts with Cuba.32 This choice to stop contracting with
companies economically engaged with Burma serves as one step, although not
necessarily a final step, toward achieving greater economic responsibility.33
Ineluctably, the Framers hammered out a democratic political process char-
acterized by a dual level system of federalism from the forge of the sweltering
summer of 1789. 4 But the Framers, in creating our federalist system, did not intend
the federal government to have unbridled authority to eliminate state autonomy.
35
"If the Founding Fathers really intended to take all foreign-policy activities away
from local and state governments, surely they would have said so.''36 Invariably, a
29. Id. at 203.
30. See Bilder, supra note I, at 828-29 (decrying the cursory discounting of state laws that involve local
political decisions impacting foreign affairs as simply popularity boosters, because local laws require participation
in the democratic process by allowing the input of others concerning foreign affairs issues).
31. See Louis HENKN, FOREIGN AFIAIRS AND THE CONsTrTnON 238 (1972) (cataloging the inevitable
promulgation of local laws that will influence foreign affairs).
32. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22J(a) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting trade with all
companies doing business in Burma), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.471 (West Supp. 1998) (making it Florida's
policy to divest any investment made by the State Board of Administration in the form of stocks, securities or other
obligations with any institution or company domiciled in the United States or foreign subsidiary doing business with
Cuba). See Eduardo E. Neret & Marcio W. Valladares, The Florida International Affairs Act: A Model For State
Activism In Foreign Affairs, I J.TRANsNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 199-206 (1992) (describing the Florida International
Affairs Commission which functions to establish a uniform international policy for the state regarding trade,
investment, tourism and education).
33. See Henry Richardson, 11, Current Development of the Stock Portfolio of the Society, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 744, 746 (1987) (explaining that the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law chose to
divest from South Africa, ratho.r than other nations, because of the massive and continued violation of international
law perpetrated by Pretoria).
34. See GEOFFREY STONE Er AL, supra note 3, at 148 (explaining the Framers' purpose of creating a
federalist system of government and their fear it might not work efficiently).
35. Kenneth Starr et. al., The Law of Preemption, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. OFANTrrRUSTL. 6.43 (recounting that
the Constitution affirms the states as integral parts of the national system). Moreover, the Tenth Amendment
recognizes the cogent role that the States must play in the governance of our federalist system. Id.
36. Shuman, supra note 8, at 163.
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 29
federal system thrives on its ability to generate various solutions to unique
problems. Discounting states input on these issues would eliminate fifty viable can-
didates to generate specialized policy, not to mention the thousands of cities that
also can provide much needed innovation.37 Hence, as will be discussed, ostensibly
38the Framers intended to have states act to influence foreign-policy activities.
Therefore, these state acts comport with the Framers' goals of providing for a rich
political discourse and evidence the cogent features of political action within a
federal system.
A. The Statutes, Ordinances, and Acts
Uniformly, the state laws denounce Burma as an archetypal dictatorial regime
lacking political legitimacy.39 The incessant killing and repression sponsored by
SLORC reinforce the reality that, despite diplomatic pressure from the federal
government, SLORC will not unilaterally effectuate the state laws' twin aims of
Burma's future adherence to international human rights law and Burma's granting
democratic elections.' Although moralistic in tone, the laws make it clear that
curtailing dealings with Burma and companies doing business with Burma there
exemplify state citizens' desires to influence Washington and international com-
panies not to interact commercially with Burma and instead to condemn SLORC.4'
The selective purchasing laws proscribe contracts with companies doing business
with SLORC.42 Some exceptions to these laws exist, including allowances for news
and media involvement in Burma.4 3 Additionally, existing contracts that are neither
37. Starr, supra note 35, at 43.
38. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 163 (detailing that the enumerated powers of Congress do not contravene
most municipal policies affecting foreign affairs).
39. See, e.g., HB 6354 CONN. 1997 (providing that Connecticut will not deal with the repressive SLORC
regime).
40. See Dallett & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 126 (advocating that Congress forego all investment
opportunities in Burma because discussions through diplomatic channels appeared ineffectual to create the desired
change).
41. See CAL. AB 888 (1997) (acknowledging the need to prevent relations with the military regime in
Burma).
42. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 180-82 n.22. Discussing the following provisions:
Berkeley Cal. Resolution No. 57, 881-N.S., III.B. & IV.B. (Feb. 28, 1995) (prohibiting the municipality
from creating contracts with any person who "buys, sells, leases or distributes commodities in the
conduct of business with, or who provides or is willing to provide personal services to ... any person
for the express purpose of assisting in business operations or trading with any public or private entity
located in Burma"); Oakland, Cal., Selective Purchasing Law (debarring entities listed as having
involvements with Burma); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct, 28, 1996) (disqualifying
any lawyer or law firm from representing the city if it represents "any person or corporation which has
equity ties with any public or private entity that is located in Burma or has direct investment or
employees in Burma."
Id.
43. See CAL. AB 888 (1997) (exempting media and news coverage from the law).
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extended nor modified also receive exemptions, as prescribed by the United States
Constitution."
The statutes provide a mechanism for determining which entities constitute
personas non gratas by compiling names of "all persons currently doing business
in Burma."45 To generate the list, typically, the state utilizes a private service to in-
vestigate and catalogue all persons doing business in Burma.46 Although amorphous
and undefined in the statutes themselves, the term "doing business" in this context
presumably will receive a very broad interpretation and thus companies with neg-
ligible dealings in Burma would still not likely enjoy an exemption. 47
The various laws' actual effect on corporate behavior avert conclusive assess-
ment because of their recent inception.48 However, the laws have influenced
corporate behavior. Companies including Levi-Strauss, Liz Claibourne, Eddie
Bauer, Inc., Pepsi, Co., Macy's, Apple Computer, Amoco, Phillips Electronics, and
Carlsberg have unilaterally deserted Burma before determining whether the laws
prohibit future governmental contracts with them or whether the statutes' am-
biguities allow them an exception.49 In addition, the White House, foreign nations,
international trading blocs, and interest groups have wrestled with how to interact
strategically with these statutes.50
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (preventing the dissolution of existing contracts); see CAL. AB 888 (1997)
(shielding those companies with pre-existing contracts from the statute's strictures).
45. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 130 § 22 J(b) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that any person shown
on the list is an ineligible trading partner); CAL. AB 888 (1997) (allowing a private company to compile a list of
companies involved with Burma); see also Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 182 n.22 (noting that
"Madison's ordinance, Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471 I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15, 1995), will use a list
compiled by the Council on Economic Priorities to determine which entities have an "economic interest" in Burma,
and then will define economic interest to include "direct investment, licensing and leasing agreements, and the
operation of sales outlets in Burma [Myanmar]").
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 22 J(a) (West Supp. 1996).
47. See CAL. AB 888 (1997) (propounding that this bill would prohibit the state from entering into any
contractual agreement with the military regime in Burma, any business or corporation organized under the authority
of the military regime in Burma, or any person on a list of persons currently doing business with Burma that is
prepared and maintained by the Department of General Services). But see Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24,
at 181-82 (criticizing the statutes for not clarifying what constitutes "doing business" for purposes of the
prohibition).
48. See Barbara Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Pro-
tection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN J. GLOBALTRADE 153,187 (1997) (listing a number of companies
that have left Burma and commenting that the majority of the companies have left because of domestic pressure).
49. See Bernstein & Kean, supra note 21, at A23 (describing the exodus of companies from Burma to avoid
being stigmatized as unethical); see also Frey, supra note 48, at 187 (outlining how Levi-Strauss considers which
countries to affiliate with by assessing pertinent criteria such as how the company's image will appear to purchasers
and whether the social turmoil will threaten their commercial interest); Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at
202 (cataloging several companies that have deserted Burma); Paul Elias, S.F. Human Rights Agency Caught In
Cross Fire, RECORDER, Mar. 7, 1997 at 1 (writing that a recent decision, ABB Daimler-Benz Transp. Inc. v. City
of San Francisco, 98531, upheld the San Francisco's Human Rights Commission decision to bar a contract with
a company dealing with Burma against challenges that the commission has inordinate power).
50. See Altbach, supra note 27, at I (commenting that groups representing business including USA-
Engage- a business coalition formed to protest the use of unilateral U.S. trade and investment sanctions--have
considered mounting a challenge to the local initiatives). Moreover, the article notes that Japan and the European
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In evident ways, the statutes, in conjunction with Washington's statements,
have succeeded. By creating greater interest in the plight of Burma's repressed, and
by inspiring attempts for legislation proscribing affiliations with other human rights
violators, the selective contract laws have gone a long way towards modifying the
behavior of governments and international companies.5 t Innovatively, courts have
found new latitude for protecting international human rights by holding inter-
national oil producers Unocal and Total liable for harms committed upon Burmese
citizens by SLORC.52 To proclaim the laws as devoid of a concrete purpose seems
counter-intuitive in the face of the company departures, potential national policy
changes, and the possibility for tort liability.53 Finally, local action influences the
national debate. For example, cities "showed the Reagan administration the extent
of the public sentiment against the arms race through nuclear freeze resolutions,
against 'constructive engagement' with South Africa through divestment ordi-
nances, and against supporting the Contra war through U.S.-Nicaragua sister cities
programs. 5 4
Entities, such as state governments, and individuals expressing disagreement
with a particular national policy allows for a more robust debate and increased
thoughtfulness concerning unpopular activities. States, through the auspices of the
First Amendment, wield similar authority to express their view through commercial
Union have initiated proceedings in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to ban the selective-contract laws. Id.;
see also EU/US: US Urges Delay in EU Move To Challenge to Massachusetts' Burma Law, EUR. REP., June 18,
1997 (reporting that United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky has written to the European Trade
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan to try and quell a possible legal battle over Massachusetts' selective contract law);
Henriette Campagie, Japan Protests Massachusetts Law, MASS. LAW. WKLY, Feb. 10, 1997, at 31 (revealing that
Japan has complained to the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. trade representative and the then-governor of
Massachusetts, William Weld, concerning the selective-contact law).
51. See Frey, supra note 48, at 169-70 (cataloging several attempts to pass legislation proscribing trade with
Burma, China, and to encourage companies to adopt and comply with a code of conduct regarding human rights
abuses); see also Altbach, supra note 27, at 2 (reporting that United States Trade Representative, Charlene
Barshefsky, has pledged that Washington would defend the Massachusetts statute against a challenge by the
European Union and Japan in the WTO).
52. See Joseph D. Pizzurro & Nancy E. Delaney, New Perilfor Companies Doing Business Overseas; Alien
Tort Claims Act Interpreted Broadly, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at 3-7 (considering the impact of Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), which allowed a suit against two international companies in American
courts for their involvement in violations of human rights in Burma).
53. See Frey, supra note 48, at 174 (applauding the appearance of private initiatives to regulate transnational
corporations' conduct regarding human rights); see also Altbach, supra note 27, at 3 (quoting Trade Representative
Barshefsky as stating, "Had the WTO existed to hear such complaints against state sanction laws 10 years ago, state
sanctions against South Africa which helped to bring peaceful democracy to that country would never have been
possible.").
54. Shuman, supra note 8, at 172 (stressing that municipal activities generate greater accountability and
provide forums for policies that would not be otherwise recognized in national policy debates).
55. See generally Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (protecting anti-abortion speech
against overly inclusive buffers surrounding abortion clinics); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,406 (1992) (quoting
Eu v. San Francisco City Democratic Cent. Comm., 494 U.S. 214, 223 (1989), that when considering political
speech "the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(recognizing the importance of protecting speech intended to influence the political mechanism).
359
1998 / Constitutionality of State Laws
restrictions. 56 Indeed, state decisions not to trade with rogue nations, for example
Cuba, have failed to inspire rancorous criticism and manifest how states can act to
voice their concern.57 By precluding states from determining contractual relation-
ships without the federal government definitively determining the issue causes the
constitutional goals of a balanced bi-level system and desired state input to
needlessly fail.
58
Certainly arguments exist that states have usurped national power by essentially
creating their own foreign policy. For example, some states have ministers of
foreign affairs and, similarly, some foreign nations send economic advisors to
address state governments as well as Washington. 59 Furthermore, by attempting to
influence foreign policy, states arguably implement de facto foreign policy.6
However, this argument proves too much because the final decision regarding
trade barriers and sanctions rests with the White House and Congress because they
could easily silence state actors.6' Influencing Washington serves as an impetus
behind sundry legislation, such as advocating for chemical castration of repeat
sexual offenders.62 Similarly, selective contract laws serve to provide the vital
diversity needed to find solutions to difficult problems. Therefore, these laws do not
serve as foreign policy, but rather exemplify how nonfederal political units can
effectively voice an opinion concerning international issues.63
56. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (articulating that the First Amendment
embodies "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open").
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.854 (West Supp. 1998) (indicating Florida's willingness to participate in,
and to try to augment, the economic embargo of Cuba); see also id. § 288.853(a) (castigating the acts of Fidel
Castro and his government and declaring them threats to "international peace and to the peace of the State of
Florida").
58. See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 96
(1988) (explaining the importance of using states as laboratories for regulatory innovation thereby creating a rich
debate generated by fifty separate voices).
59. See Altbach, supra note 27, at 2-3 (discussing the need for foreign governments to consider state policy
in determining how to structure trade debate with the United States).
60. See generally Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 199 (specifying that states should be cautious
not to invade the federal government's control of federal policy).
61. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (emphasizing the constitutional scheme that requires the
federal government to affirmatively act to prohibit states from legislating in particular arenas).
62. See Jason 0. Runkel, Comment, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California's Mandatory Chemical
Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547, 549 (1997) (remarking that California's recent passage of mandatory chemical
castration for repeat child offenders, which comes on the heels of the Federal Crime Act passed by Washington,
could serve to influence Washington to create even stiffer penalties for sex offenders nationwide).
63. See Altbach, supra note 27, at 3 (representing that these laws embody efforts by voters to promote the
democratic freedoms of peoples overseas while, at the same time, protecting their rights as U.S. citizens and groups,
such as Public Citizen, to ensure that local government decisions reflect majoritarian political values).
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This
of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of
government, the manner in which government, is operated or should be
operated and all such matters relating to political processes.
64
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from passing laws that "abridge the
freedom of speech. ' '65 While the Amendment has never received such a broad inter-
pretation to preclude all laws that circumscribe speech,6 the Supreme Court has
provided greater protection for speech surrounding the political process.6 7 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to political expression in order to assure "the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. 68
By defining political speech as a fundamental First Amendment value, the pro-
tection it supplies to political speech serves as an antidote for abuses by govern-
mental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for "keeping officials
elected by the people responsible to all people whom they were selected to serve.
' 69
Without this freedom the Framers' goal of improving our society and keeping it free
through public debate would falter.7° Without this free trade in ideas, the public
interest in gathering information to make informed choices would not receive ample712
protection.7' Concomitantly, representative reinforcement,72 the process of electing
representatives that embrace similar views of a particular polity, would function
64. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218-19 (1966).
65. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
66. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (deciding that "fighting words," those
words that would stir a normal listener to fight, do not enjoy First Amendment protection); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that words used as personal abuse and epithets are not in any sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)
(determining that the First Amendment was not intended to provide an immunity for every possible use of
language). But see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (finding
the First Amendment to be a complete prohibition against the government making laws abridging the freedom of
speech).
67. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,346-47 (1995) (recounting previous decisions
regarding the dissemination of information concerning candidates and the exposition of ideas).
68. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957).
69. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219.
70. Id.
71. See Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (protecting individuals who wish to enter the
marketplace of ideas from governmental attack); see also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,864 (1974)
(Powell J., dissenting) (arguing for greater protections of speech concerning public debate on important issues).
72. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1982) (reflecting that the decisions made by
elected representatives represent the will of the majority, and if the elected official does not adhere to the majority,
or the majority's view shifts, then the official will not enjoy reelection).
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ineffectively because discordant views would not receive an ample opportunity for
discussion and therefore, potential political representatives would not mold their
platforms and voting decisions to account for these views.73
Based on the constitutional premise that political speech deserves the greatest
protection and serves a vital interest, laws enacted by states to manifest disagree-
ment or embrace values different from federal governmental policies deserve
similar deference.74 Legislation, notwithstanding effective special interest group
lobbying, embodies the majority views of the political locality, whether state,
national, or municipal.7 5 Legislation, thus serves as a vehicle for a particular
populace to express itself and define debate at the national level.7 6 In this case, state
laws concerning banning contracts with companies that have dealings with Burma
embody local views toward Burma's violations of human rights.77 The Congres-
sional-discussion of how to approach the atrocities in Burma included consideration
of these state laws and, in fact, used the laws as possible models for federal legis-
lation.78 Therefore, the states acted as participants in the national debate by
contributing their respective views, thus engaging in the quintessential feature of
the First Amendment: participation in the political process.
By denying states the opportunity to legislate in this manner, the federal
government would lose the rich diversity of opinions and viewpoints that the states
can generate, and thus eliminate the opportunity for state law to influence federal
legislation. 79 However, this debate could be entirely foreclosed if Congress
definitively prevented states from legislating on the matter.80 This would not pre-
vent a continued dialogue of these issues, but the debate would center on repealing
or changing federal law, or enactment of state law that would not violate federal law
guidelines.
73. See id. at 145-48 (noting that when there is a prejudice against "a discrete and insular minority," the
legislature is likely to ignore or undervalue the interests of the minority and emphasizing that the judiciary should
only strictly scrutinize legislation if that "legislation impinges on first amendment values by restricting those
political processes which ordinarily can be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation").
74. Id. at 155-57.
75. Id. (according to Ely, a democratic government owes its citizens ample opportunity to voice their
opinions concerning legislation so that a legislature can assess the costs and benefits of a proposed law against the
position of it's constituents).
76. Id. at 145-57.
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing how government officials can influence the
national debate by voicing concerns over foreign policy); see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text
(describing the state selective laws' purpose and scope).
78. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 186 (noting that "Senator Mitchell McConnell of Kentucky
tried without success to persuade his colleagues in the U.S. Senate to require U.S. business interests to withdraw
from Burma, the stated purpose of the local measures").
79. See id. at 186-87 (noting the Congressional discussion involving state and local legislation on Burma
before settling on their own legislation).
80. See infra Part IV.B (considering the role of preemption and federalism and noting the importance for
cautious application of preemption without definitive action by Congress).
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Absent a definitive Congressional statement, prohibiting states from imple-
menting legislation concerning selective contract laws effectively acts as a prior
restraint on speech.81 Prior restraints have been "considered a more drastic infringe-
ment on free speech than subsequent punishment."8 2 Indeed the modem Supreme
Court has recognized, "liberty of the press.., has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship. ' 83 Similarly, devoid
of Congressional legislation to the contrary, the abhorrence of prior restraints would
also weigh in favor of allowing states to pass legislation concerning Burma.84
Though the Constitution does not require states to act on all issues, and even
forbids them to do so in some situations notwithstanding the First Amendment,85 the
First Amendment provides the necessary protections for states to voice their
opinions on issues when they decide to do so. 86 The premise that the First Amend-
ment protects this activity is strengthened when considered in relation with how
Congress can choose to preempt the states from legislating in particular areas which
is discussed in part IV below.
IV. PREEMPTION: BENIGN ARBITRARINESS
"The foundation of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which gave rise
to the doctrine of preemption, was colored by the concerns of the Framers that the
Constitution would strike an unworkable balance between federal and state
interests. 87 The Framers carefully compromised between the goals of nationally
81. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (considering a noncriminal process which
required the prior submission of a film to a censor before release failed because the process was devoid of prompt
judicial oversight of films that a censor disapproves of thus effectively acting as a prior restraint); see also GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 997 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing the Framers' aversion to prior restraints because
of the English technique of restricting speech before its exposure to the populace).
82. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 969 (4th ed. 1991); see also Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (reciting that the "right against freedom from previous restraint upon
publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading
purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision").
83. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
84. See GUNTHER, supra note 81, at 997-98 (articulating that the Framers' desired to eliminate prior
restraints, because one philosophical theme supporting free speech is the value of freedom of expression for a
system of representative democracy and self-government).
85. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (dictating that, "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in payment of Debts; Pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.").
86. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 177 (lamenting the loss of state and local input by prohibiting states and
cities from legislating on issues touching on foreign affairs because that would degrade the importance of the rights
of protest, speech and assembly).
87. David A. Herrman, Comment, To Delegate Or Not To Delegate-That is Preemption: The Lack of
Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28
PAc. LJ. 1157, 1161 (1997).
1998 / Constitutionality of State Laws
uniform laws and the particular needs of individual states. 88 Because the Framers
understood that, of the three branches of government, Congress alone represents the
states as states, the Framers gave Congress the authority and responsibility to
balance federal and state power by choosing to preempt state laws with federal
legislation.8 9
A. The Mechanism of Preemption
The question whether federal law preempts state law is one of congressional or
Presidential intent, with the "purpose of Congress [being] the ultimate touch-
stone."9° Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws and treaties of the
United States are "the Supreme Law of the Land"9' and, thus, they trump state law.
Preemption may be expressed or implied and is compelled whether Congress's
command is "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in
its structure and purpose." 92
The three mechanisms of preemption include express preemption, occupying
the field, and when the state law stands as an obstacle to enforcement of federal
law.93 The express preemption approach requires courts to rely on statutory con-
struction to settle conflicts between state and federal law; a finding of congressional
intent to preempt state law will resolve the conflict in favor of the federal law. 94 For
the instant controversy, this analysis provides the initial step in determining if local
88. See Project: The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 107, I11 (Paula A.
Sinozich et al., ed. 1993) (stating that, although the Framers understood that supreme federal power was essential
to a coherent national government, they were concerned with the preservation of state autonomy).
89. See Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1429, 1432-33 (1984) (describing Congress's unique role among the three branches of government as the
representative of the states as states, and therefore concluding that it is the most suited branch of government to
balance the competing interests of federal power and states' rights); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 134-35
(James Madison) (Roy Fairfield ed. 1981) (teaching that "states need not fear any loss of power by the federal
government overreaching because of the federalist system of government"); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLrICAL PROCESS 176-79 (1980) (explaining that the structural aspects of the national
political system safeguard states' rights and individual autonomy).
90. Allis Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,208 (1985).
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
92. Jones v. Ruth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977). See generally English v. General Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72 (1990) (illuminating the three types of preemption); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85. 95, 98 (1983)
(analyzing the Employment Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 514(a) (West 1997))
which expressly supersedes "all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan").
93. See Christi R. Martin, Note. Preemption in theAge ofLocal Regulatory Innovation: Fitting the Formula
to a Different Kind of Conflict, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1831, 1833-34 (1992) (describing the three preemption doctrines).
94. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-81 (2d ed. 1988); see Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (recognizing preemption by implication). See generally Medtronic v.
Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (harmonizing discordant circuit court decisions by declaring that the Federal Medical
Device Amendment (MDA) did not preempt state tort law).
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legislation will survive a preemption challenge.95 Congress has enacted legislation
that provides for conditional sanctions against Burma, preventing domestic cor-
porations from initiating new contracts there, but does not cover foreign com-
panies.96 These sanctions require that until "the President certifies to Congress that
Burma has made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights
practices and implementing democratic government" sanctions such as "the
termination of most bilateral assistance and obstruction by the United States of most
multilateral assistance will follow."97 In a similar vein, President Clinton has issued
an Executive Order98 that prohibits new investment in Burma, contingent upon
Burma's ability to comply with existing laws, regulations and directives." These
laws complement each other because they neither prohibit all United States com-
panies from contracting there, nor do they bar all American presence in Burma."°°
Neither Congress nor the Executive has explicitly stated that federal law supersedes
all state measures. Thus, with full knowledge of these state laws, the federal govern-
ment has determined the better course was to create a penalty process that does not
disturb existing state law,01 and in so doing did not expressly manifest a clear
intention to displace existing state law. 02
The second method of preemption requires Congress to legislate in a manner
that "occupies the field."'0 3 This test requires the federal law to legislate so
95. See Martin, supra note 93, at 1835 (opining that comparing statutory language effectively decides few
preemption controversies because Congress unlikely contemplated the conflict and so did not expressly preempt
the law).
96. OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified
as 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701); see also Altbach, supra note 27, at4 (underscoring the difference between the federal and
state contracting laws, with the former excluding foreign companies and with the latter including those companies).
97. OMNIBUSCONSOLIDATEDAPPROPRATIONACTof 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified
as 50 USCA § 1701).
98. Executive Order No. 13047,62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (1997), 22 USCA § 2378.
99. Id.
100. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 186-88 n.50 (noting that the support for the federal law
derives from its flexibility and its purpose of allowing the United States to retain a presence in Burma).
101. See S. Candace Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685,694-
95 (1991) (finding that eliminating state laws through less than explicit means does an injustice to federalism
because it effectively closes an avenue for communities to implement strategies to solve problems).
102. See Gade v. National Solid Waste Mfg. Bd., 505 U.S. 88, 116 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting) (analyzing
preemption from a starting point that "the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458-
61 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not apply to a state's mandatory
retirement provisions affecting state judges because this area was ofthe most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity
and one that required Congress's intent to displace state decisions in this area to be clearly stated); see also Martin,
supra note 93, at 1834-35 (criticizing courts which defer to nonexistent congressional intent to preempt local laws
because Congress realized that a conflict could arise in the future and had the opportunity to solve the legal riddle
at the time).
103. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (finding state law
is preempted by federal law if the federal law so thoroughly regulates a legislative field that Congress allowed no
additional room to regulate); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (explaining that congressional intent to supersede state law may be inferred from a federal
regulatory scheme that leaves no room to supplement it); see also Martin, supra note 93, at 1833-34 (comparing
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thoroughly as to foreclose states from augmenting federal law in this area.1 4 States
have found ample room to maneuver in the area governing contracts with Burma
by implementing legislation that concerns penalties and further contractual
restrictions not considered by Congress, such as including foreign companies within
the ban. 05 Moreover, the minimal Congressional and presidential action in this area
does not equate with the detail necessary to preempt legislation by "occupying the
field," as evidenced in existing case law.t°6 Hence, the selective contract laws
survive the occupy the field test.
The local measures also survive the final possible method of preemption, the
stands as an obstacle approach. 07 This test has served to preempt state law not only
when the state laws obstruct the accomplishment of a federal objective, but also
when the laws frustrate a congressional goal or pose a potential for frustration of
that goal.l 8 However, judicial application of this standard has proven difficult and
unpredictable.' 9 For example, the Airline Deregulation Act (AADA) bars "states
from enforcing any law . . . relating to rates, routes, and services of any air
carrier."t 0 The court held in Hodges v. Delta Airlines,"t tapplying the AADA, that
claims against an airline for in-flight injuries were not preempted." 2 In contrast, in
the various methods of preemption and determining that frequently local legislation will survive absent explicit
preemption by the federal government); Spiro, supra note 6, at 830-31 (analyzing President Reagan's decision to
sign an executive order that would hurt the machinery of South African apartheid, but was not designed to result
in American economic withdrawal from South Africa thereby not preempting local legislation in this area).
104. See Martin, supra note 93, at 1836 (detailing the requirements of the occupies the field test),
105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7 § 22(h) (precluding contracts with any person); Altbach, supra note
27, at 4.
106. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04 (requiring a very detailed set of laws to preempt
by occupying the field).
107. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (elucidating a standard that, regardless of
whether federal law occupies a field, a state law must be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress); see also Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State
Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEx. L.REV. 1743, 1745-48 (1992) (tracing the taxonomy of this standard
and other standards, which includes the "actual conflict," "physical impossibility," and "disruptive effect" tests,
and concluding that all of them can be subsumed under the rubric of the "stands as an obstacle approach").
108. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 717 (evidencing the Court's desire to distance itself from the
inference that preemption should result whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively); see also
Martin, supra note 93, at 1838 n.52 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 231-34 (1981), which held that a
state community property law, when applied to military retirement pay, has the "potential to frustrate" congressional
objectives ofproviding forretired service members and meeting personnel management needs in the active military
forces).
109. See Nim Razook, A Contract-Enhancing Norm Limiting Federal Preemption of Presumptively State
Domains, 11 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 163, 164-65 (1997) (discussing the confusion surrounding the purpose of
federalism). Razook also has compiled several alternative points of view that advocate for state action to survive
except in limited circumstances. Id. at 170.
110. 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b) (West Supp. 1998).
111. 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
112. See id. at 338-40 (reasoning that while Congress had limited actions concerning airline services because
the plaintiff asserted a tort action not concerning service, but rather negligence in storing a box of rum, the claim
could go forward).
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Harris v. American Airlines,"' the court held that a claim for personal injury
alleged to have resulted from the airline's in-flight service of alcoholic beverages
was preempted.
1 4
Under the rubric of frustrating or inhibiting a congressional goal, state laws
regulating trade with Burma seem especially innocuous. In a field traditionally
occupied by the states, the Supreme Court starts "with the assumption that the his-
toric police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 15 Regulating how a
local government spends its own money arguably falls within this category.
11 6
Indeed, other laws regulating in the field of foreign relations in apparent disregard
of federal law have received a clean bill of health." 7 However, the Supreme Court
has preempted laws that did not contravene federal law but mainly made it more
onerous to comply with a two-dimensional federal and state standard118 or hindered
the policy of creating national law uniformity." 9 On one level, the local laws do not
frustrate Congress's purpose, in that federal law allows for conditional sanctions
against Burma if "the government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for
political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale
repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition."' 20 Meanwhile, state
laws restrict any new contractual efforts with Burma from the present forward,
113. 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. See id. at 1476-77 (determining that the activities of the airline flight crew constituted "service" and thus
both negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based on conduct of the flight crew during
the flight were preempted).
115. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 206 (holding that although the Atomic Energy Act is
comprehensive federal legislation regulating safety aspects of nuclear facilities, states retain their traditional
responsibility for determining the need for power and, therefore, a presumption against preemption serves as the
starting point of the analysis).
116. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 214 (1984) (conceding that
municipalities are treated like states, are subject to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and implying that they
can enjoy similar benefits as states, such as deciding with whom they contract); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (explaining that state preferential contracting does not violate the Constitution).
117. See generally Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1990) (concerning
preemption of a city ordinance directing that no city employee pension funds were to be invested in companies
doing business with South Africa or invested in South Africa directly); see also TRIBE, supra note 94, at 480 n.12
(2d ed. 1988) (averring that states and localities are not preempted from engaging in their own efforts to end
apartheid in South Africa). But see Spiro, supra note 6, at 829-31 (commenting that the United States government,
under President Reagan's aegis, supported a policy of economic engagement that ran in obvious contravention of
local laws promoting divestment).
118. See generally Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) (preempting a state law that promoted the
cleanup of oil spills and other toxic substances); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (preempting
a state law that mandated oil tanker construction and modification in piloting procedures to reduce the likelihood
of an oil spill harming Puget Sound).
119. See United Steel Workers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362,371-72 (1990) (preempting a claim based on breach
of a union's duty of fair representation).
120. OMNmUSCONSOLrDATEDAPPROPRiATONSAcrofl997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110Stat. 3009 (codified
as 50 USCA § 1701).
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without requiring triggering events.' The restrictions on new investment 22
promulgated by Congress and the state standards mirror one another. 23 Inasmuch
as it is feasible to comply with both laws without creating any conflict, the state
laws ostensibly do not violate any rules of preemption, 24 notwithstanding the
tortured and uneasy state of preemption doctrine.
t25
B. Preemption and Federalism: A Tricky Marriage
A more potent anodyne for the conflicting state of preemption doctrine that bol-
sters the viability of State debarment laws is found in the principles of federalism. 26
The renaissance of federalism, with its banner carried by National League of Cities
v. Usery,t27 appeared suddenly. National League of Cities manifested the Court's
decision to limit the extent of the federal government to set maximum hour and
minimum wage provisions for almost all state employees.' 28 The reasoning of the
121. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 180-182 (discussing Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No.
57,881- N.S., III.B and IV.B (Feb. 28, 1995); Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15,
1995); Tacoma Park Md, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28. 1996) as examples of statutes that preclude all future
contracts without a change in Burmese policy).
122. See OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS AcT of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(codified as 50 USCA § 1701) (defining "new investment" as "any activity that is undertaken pursuant to an
agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement that is entered into with the government
of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma, on or after the date of the certification for the entry into a contract
that includes the economical development of resources located in Burma or the entry into a contract providing for
the general supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract; the purchase of a share
of ownership, including an equity interest, in that development; the entry into a contract providing for the
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in that development without regard to the form of participation"); see
also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (1997) (authorizing the President to investigate, regulate or prohibit any transactions in
foreign exchange or involving property transactions in which any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States).
123. See, e.g., CAL. AB 888 (1997) (defining "new investment" as those contracts formed after the effective
date of the statute, but exempting contract extensions and contracts deemed necessary for the health, safety, and
welfare of the state populace).
124. Compare Lewis, supra note 11, at 471 (1987) (concluding that state divestment legislation did not fall
within the strictures of Congressional acts and thus were not preempted), with Spiro, supra note 6, at 848-49
(finding it impossible that state divestment legislation would survive preemption scrutiny because of congressional
enactment of anti-apartheid legislation and an executive order concerning apartheid legislation).
125. See David Rotschild, A Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New Federalism: How
to Deal with the Headache of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 829, 838 (1984) (decrying that the preemption
doctrine requires a tortured examination which has created "confusing, uncertain and even conflicting holdings");
see also Joseph T. McLauglin et al, Federal Preemption, Q247 ALI-ABA 151, 155 (1996) (cataloging recent
Supreme Court decisions to determine a rationale and basis for preemption decisions and concluding that many have
"far reaching effects upon controversial areas").
126. See Martin, supra note 93, at 1840-41 (compiling data from the Federalist papers, especially the work
of Alexander Hamilton, to supply the bulwark for her proposition that present preemption analysis derogates the
Framers' interpretation of preemption's extent); see also Herrman, supra note 87, at 1167 (discussing that for
preemption to serve the goals of federalism, "it should secure to both the federal government and the states the right
to regulate in their proper fields of authority").
127. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
128. Id. at 845.
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decision rested on the bedrock idea that Congress could not impair the states'
essential state functions and their ability to function effectively within a federal
system.
129
However, federalism's resurgence disappeared just as suddenly when, nine
years later, the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 30 forswore "any obligation to preserve the sovereignty of the states."'
3 "
In Garcia, the Court analyzed the extent the minimum wage and overtime pro-
visions of the Fair Labor and Standards Act controlled hours and wages of the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 132 The Supreme Court overruled National
League of Cities, and, in the process, concluded that state sovereign interests are
protected from Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause by
"procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal government," not "by
judicially created limitations on federal power."' 33 The Court recognized that the
true, fundamental limitations inherent in all congressional action emanate from the
built-in restraints provided by the federalist system through state participation in
federal government action, not by judicial intervention.'34 According to the Supreme
Court, the political process will correct unduly burdensome laws by electing
representatives responsive to the needs of their own constituents.
35
The constitutional authority of preemption makes it incumbent upon Congress
to make its intentions to preempt known. 136 Using a distinctively recognizable
legislative purpose insures that the implicit protections built into the federal system
can adequately respond to those responsible for unpopular lawmaking. 37 Without
such explicitness, the states are not afforded the distinct protections against pre-
emption that are implicit in a federal system. 38 In the present circumstance, states
have determined that their interests are better served by delinking contractually with
a despotic regime. 39 The goals of federalism remain unachieved by quashing
decisions made by democratically elected representatives from Oakland, Berkeley,
and Massachusetts for the sake of protecting basically similar legislation enacted
129. Id. at 844-45.
130. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
131. Martin, supra note 93, at 1842.
132. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985).
133. Id. at 552.
134. Id. at 556.
135. Id. at 551-52.
136. See Wolfson, supra note 58, at 96-102 (detailing the interplay between preemption and federalism).
137. See Starr et al., supra note 35, at 42 (emphasizing that Congress must explicitly manifest an intent to
preempt state law). Furthermore, institutional concerns. such as the judiciary usurping too much Congressional
authority, also should bolster protecting state law from non-explicit federal preemption. Id. at 47.
138. See Wolfson, supra note 58, at 100 (explaining the need for a set of safeguards on the administrative
process similar to those available when Congress legislates).
139. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(h) (West Supp. 1997) (severing Massachusetts from future
contracts with Burma); see also Shuman, supra note 139, at 174 (detailing that many cities not only had divestment
programs to combat apartheid, but also created sister-community ties to help stop removal of black townships in
South Africa).
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on Capitol Hill.'40 Preempting state laws severs the connection between citizens and
their value choices, thereby promoting voter apathy rather than robust civic
republicanism. It also undermines public debate and local input perceived as
integral for fostering the goals of local involvement in national governance.
141
States can promote the fundamental liberties and rights of their citizens by
exercising power over political factions and movements that might advocate for an
overreaching centralized government. 142 Perhaps most importantly, federalism
provides citizens the opportunity to impact government on a local level, helping to
make it more responsive to the immediate needs and evolving values of individual
communities, and less susceptible to bureaucratic inertia and elitism that plagues
Washington. 43 For the foregoing reasons, "the begin in my backyard" (BIMBY)
shibboleth acts as an apt epigram for promoting and supporting state activities that
promote good global citizenship.' 44
V. FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause provides, "[t]he Congress shall have power ... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and amongst the several States, and with
Indian Tribes."145 Provided with this express power to regulate commerce, Congress
possesses the authority to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce, and alter-
natively, can allow states to do the same by delegating this power to them.4
"Traditionally, in issues involving state regulation of foreign commerce, a higher
degree of commerce clause scrutiny applies." 47 Historically, thejudicial branch has
140. See Martin, supra note 93, at 1837, 1842 n.80 (citing Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal
Preemption, U. il. L. REV. 515,538 (1972), calling for courts to decide preemption cases on the basis of an explicit
balancing test: "federal laws should not be deemed to preempt the operation of state laws which serve important
state interests and which only marginally impinge on the operation of federal laws").
141. See Hoke, supra note 101, at 694-95 (emphasizing the importance of generating greater public parti-
cipation rather than stifling public outcry through undemocratic means such as preemption); see also Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 270 (desiring discussion of public issues in an uninhibited manner); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 306-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (providing for state experimentation to discern new methods for
successfully running local government or affairs and declaring that such experimentation is vital to improving
methods of governing that states as laboratories of experiment can provide).
142. See Starr et al., supra note 35, at 41-42 (discerning that state influence serves as a cheek over the
national government by exerting organized public pressure over centripetal political forces).
143. Id. at 42 (explaining that the ability of state and local governments to respond directly and amenably
to citizens within its specific jurisdiction is an important advantage of the federal system).
144. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 175-76 (revealing that a growing number of U.S. cities have begun to
eliminate the use of chemicals implicated in depleting the earth's ozone layer and noting the restrictions on the use
of polystyrene plastic foam and polyvinyl-chloride grocery bags, without the insistence of Congress).
145. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
146. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,318
(1992); Whitev. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,213 (1984); see also TRIBE, supra
note 94, at 403 (detailing that "Article I, section 8. is phrased as an affirmative grant of power to Congress").
147. Dreifke, supra note 14, at 281; see Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 283,286 (1976) (describing
the federal government's regulatory power over foreign commerce as exclusive).
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accorded Congress virtual plenary authority over matters involving foreign
commerce, in part because foreign commerce implicates issues concerning the
division of foreign affairs power between the states and the national government. 4 '
Further justifying federal superiority, Article I section 10 of the Constitution does
not, by its express terms, reserve State power in foreign trade or foreign relations. 49
Functional imperatives, such as national unity and agreement in international trade
matters, also justify this interpretation. 50 Indeed, the Supreme Court has articulated
the concept that the nation should "speak with one voice" in its foreign affairs,
thereby foreclosing state action that generated a possibility of confusion among the
United States' trade partners.'
A. Lessened Commerce Clause Scrutiny for Foreign Commerce
Any prohibition on contracts with corporations having dealings with Burma and
on contracts with Burma directly affects foreign commerce by creating a selectivity
in contractual partners. However, there are two arguments that support the viability
of the local laws. First, the Supreme Court has recently intimated that foreign
companies deserve less commerce clause protection than domestic companies.'
5 2
Barclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,153 involved a consolidation of two
tax-refund actions: one by Barclay's Group, a multinational banking enterprise
based in the United Kingdom with subsidiaries in California, and a second by
Colgate Palmolive Co., a U.S.-based multinational corporation with operations in
California. t" California computed the corporations' incomes with the worldwide
combined reporting method, which allows the aggregation of the total worldwide
income for all entities that composed the unitary business purpose. 5 California
148. Dreifke, supra note 14, at 281; seeJOHNE. NOWAKErAL., CONSTITUTIONALLAw 125-26 (3d ed.1986)
(discussing that the Framers provided broad powers to Congress and the executive in foreign commerce in the hopes
of maintaining uniformity of law and thereby limiting foreign agitation over what legal standards they must adhere
to when engaged in trade with the United States).
149. See NOWAK, supra note 148, at 125 (claiming that there is "no constitutional recognition of any reserved
powers of the States to involve themselves in foreign affairs").
150. See Dreifke, supra note 14, at 282 (discussing the reasoning supporting Congressional hegemony in the
area of foreign commerce).
151. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434. 452 (1979) (articulating the "one voice"
standard in the context of multiple taxation against foreign commerce as it would potentially confuse foreign trade
partners); see also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (determining that the
United States must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments). But see
Jubinsky, supra note 11, at 559 (averring that when the "one voice" criteria is not impaired, the heightened scrutiny
inherent in the Foreign Commerce clause drops out and is replaced by the regulpr interstate commerce clause
analysis).
152. See Barclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1994) (allowing California to
extend its corporate franchise tax to a foreign-based multinational corporation even though it acknowledged that
these companies are subject to a systematically higher risk of multiple taxation).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 303-04.
155. 1&. at 303.
1998 / Constitutionality of State Laws
taxed a portion of the taxpayer's worldwide income, calculated by multiplying total
worldwide income by the arithmetic average of the fractions of worldwide payroll,
property and sales located inside California.1 56 The disparate tax treatment netted
California $152,420 from the subsidiary over and above the normal tax due under
the conventional reporting method. 57 Causing more chagrin was the $604,765 in
additional taxes the corporations had to pay between 1970 and 1973 under
California's system, in contrast to, the system used by the United States, which
treats each corporate entity in a family of corporations separately. 58 The cor-
porations posited that California's reporting method violated the Commerce Clause
because the state interfered with federal policy and discriminated against inter-
national commerce.159 The Supreme Court held that Barclay's failed to demonstrate
that California's system imposed systematically disproportionate burdens on foreign
enterprises. 60
The Court also addressed two additional issues concerning the applicability of
a state tax on international commerce. The Court found California's tax valid
because it did not result in an unacceptable increase in the risk of multiple taxation
and because it did not unduly interfere with the uniformity of federal international
trade policy. t61 Concerning the multiple taxation issue, the Court adhered to the
analysis in Container Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board. 162 In following that
analysis, the Court acknowledged that Barclay's involved a foreign multinational
while Container Corp. involved a domestic multinational, and that foreign multi-
nationals are subject to a higher risk of multiple taxation.163 Nonetheless, the Court
evinced no need to modify Container Corp's. standards for foreign-based multi-
nationals and went on to determine that California's tax satisfied these standards.'
156. See CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 25101 (West 1992) (outlining the worldwide combined reporting
method); see also id. §§ 25129,25132,25134 (West 1994) (defining how property, payroll and sales factors assist
in determining final taxation); id. § 25128(a) (West Supp. 1998) (modifying the formula, now counting the
proportion of in-state sales twice).
157. Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 307.
158. Id. at 307 n.6; see also I.R.C. § 881(a) (West 1997) (detailing that for the Internal Revenue Service,
every corporation is liable for income tax, and a foreign corporation is taxable each year at 30% of the "amount
received from sources within the United States," and considering interest, salaries and wages aggregate to determine
the amount owed).
159. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 302-03 (revealing that both corporate taxpayers argued the Commerce
Clause was violated because the California law contravened federal policy).
160. Id. at 319.
161. Id.
162. 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (holding that the California tax law did not violate the Commerce Clause because
it did not overly burden foreign commerce).
163. Compare Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 317-18 (dealing with a foreign multinational corporation and the
concern of creating international animosity), with Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 186 (considering the foreign
commerce clause protections for a domestic multinational corporation that might endure multiple taxation).
164. Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 319-20.
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Some practitioners consider the federal uniformity test outlined in Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County ofLosAngeles, " as dispositive, thus striking down laws prohibiting
contracts with companies involved in Burma.'t Japan Line requires that the state
not "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential;"' 67
and, in particular, precludes laws that "prevent the Federal Government from
speaking with one voice' in international trade."'t One observer has surmised that
the Court found that California's tax satisfied the Japan Line test because no con-
gressional action preempted or obstructed California's tax, and Congress's failure
to act in the wake of Container Corp. constituted tacit acceptance of the tax as it fell
upon Congress to act if it disapproved of California's tax.169
Analogously, Congress and the President had the opportunity to regulate trade
with Burma and preempt existing state law. 170 Inasmuch as Congress has regulated
in the area of selective contract laws with Burma, but consciously chosen not to
preempt state law, strengthens the inference that the laws affecting Burma survive
Commerce Clause scrutiny. This conclusion follows from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Barclay's that congressional silence was sufficient to support existing
state law despite the heightened chance for multiple taxation..17' Furthermore, as
Japan Line and Barclay's dealt with taxes and the increased cost of doing business,
an actual increase in production cost for the respective companies,172 foreign com-
panies affected by the anti-Burma trade laws would not directly lose money because
the selective contract laws would affect only prospective contracts. Instead, the
companies would have to calculate the costs and benefits of forfeiting doing
business in Burma or in the particular states. 73 Thus, the effect wrought by the
selective contract legislation actually affects foreign companies to a lessened extent
than the more severe but viable California taxing scheme examined in Barclay's.
165. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
166. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 190 (concluding that Japan Line serves to undermine state
laws that adversely affect foreign commerce).
167. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448. See generally Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990)
(denying states' capacity to withdraw from National Guard training exercises, because this is an area that mandates
federal uniformity).
168. Id. at 453 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
169. See Leading Cases Constitutional Law: Commerce Clause, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 142-43 (1994)
[hereinafter Leading Cases Constitutional Law] (determining the Court emphasized that the negative implication
of Congressional deference to state law manifested the law's validity).
170. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 187-89 (describing the President's and Congress's
reluctance to eclipse state law).
171. See Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 142.43 (commenting that actions taken by
Congress that do not eclipse state laws deserve greater deference because of tacit Congressional acceptance).
172. Id. at 142.
173. See Frey, supra note 48, at 187-88 (illustrating why several companies left Burma to protect more
profitable domestic contracts).
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Although Barclay's cries out for sundry interpretations, 74 the most cogent view
discerns the Court affirmatively eliminating a double standard, one for domestic
corporations and another more stringent one for foreign companies and thereby
equating foreign corporations to American companies. 175 The Court's decision to
allow California's taxation of foreign nationals, despite the corporations' possibility
of incurring multiple taxation in conjunction with their limited access to judicial
and political mechanisms in the state to ensure fair apportionment, ostensibly
affirmed that foreign-based multinationals are treated under the same standards as
domestic corporations. 7 6 Further, the Court may have implicitly recognized the new
realities of the post-Cold War world; a world beset with numerous actors acting in
numerous forums.177
Moreover, the strongest rationale underlying the Commerce Clause-the eco-
nomic union argument-is inapposite when considering foreign commerce.1'7
Discriminating against another domestic company patently subjects the nation to
extreme state protectionism. 7 9 However, with state discrimination against foreign-
based corporations in international commerce, the concern differs because a state
will not likely retaliate against another state for protectionist legislation burdening
foreign commerce. 80 This same analysis logically flows for state discrimination
against a foreign nation.'1
8
174. See Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 144-46 (averring that three interpretations
of the case are apparent: First, the Court might have downplayed the importance of the multiple-taxation argument;
second, the Court could have reemphasized the long-standing theory that dormant commerce clause analysis
depends on the nature of the commerce burdened, not on the identity of the parties affected; third, the case might
imply that foreign companies deserve less dormant commerce clause protection than domestic companies).
175. Id. at 145.
176. Id. See generally Wardair Canada. Inc. v Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (upholding a state
tax on aviation fuel, including fuel purchased by foreign carriers for use on international routes); Keith Highet &
George Kahale, II, International Decisions: Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 88 AM, J. INT'L
L. 766, 767 (1994) (arguing that the Court relied on words unspoken by Congress in accepting the state tax
structures).
177. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 821-22 (noting that states and cities have assumed increasing prominence
at the international level and that the federal government is doing very little to rein them in); Highet & Kahale,
supra note 176, at 768 (commenting that other countries have come to realize that the United States government
might not possess hegemony over all domestic political decisions and noting that nations have initiated direct
political contacts with states).
178. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 430-32 (1981)
(suggesting that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause to prevent economic parochialism and injustices among
the States).
179. See id. at 431 (discussing the fear of conflicting local interests which could generate protectionist
measures).
180. See Dreifke, supra note 14, at 282 (determining that potential state retaliation against other states for
inhibiting foreign commerce did not concern the Framers' as much as possible foreign retaliation against
discriminatory state laws); Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 147 (commenting that state
retaliation against laws affecting foreign commerce should not be a paramount concern).
181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 205.0532 (West 1997) (giving carte blanche to Floridian cities to
economically discriminate against Cuba).
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Of course, the foreign Commerce Clause purportedly prevents individual states
from inciting retaliatory measures by foreign governments, 82 which would harm the
United States as a whole. 83 However, this argument requires the judiciary to have
a sophisticated, up-to-date understanding of the current nuances of American trade
policy.' The legislative branch and administrative agencies of the federal govern-
ment are better situated than the judiciary to analyze the country's trade needs.
85
Furthermore, if concerns of infringements on foreign commerce should serve as a
variable in assessing the constitutionality of state measures, the courts would have
to engage in speculation on how to weigh the likelihood and magnitude of foreign
retaliation. 86 Therefore, it seems injudicious to have courts solve this policy
dilemma.
In this instance, Burma lacks a means of retaliating and international
companies would probably notjettison operations from the United States in protest,
although their home countries might choose to develop anti-U.S. trade policies. 87
The decision whether to forego trade with the United States or to end relations with
Burma mandates a cost-benefit analysis-something that always factors into
rational business dealing.1
88
Federalism principles allow each state to decide individually how to apportion
and spend state revenues without federal influence.18 9 Thus, prohibiting states from
engaging in this practice, in effect, unduly places restrictions on state laws affecting
182. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 308-09 (noting that California's tax system did provoke the United
Kingdom to retaliate with increased taxes on American imports); Highet & Kahale, supra note 176, at 769 n.20
(recording that California changed its worldwide reporting method in the face of proposed United Kingdom (UK)
retaliatory legislation directed not at the United States as a whole, but at California alone in the form of the Income
and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, pt. XVIII, ch. 111 § 812 and sched. 30, paras. 20, 21 (Eng.)). But see Leading
Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 142 (commenting that the court was not concerned with foreign
reaction to state taxation policies).
183. See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 399 (3d Cir. 1987) (arguing that the Commerce Clause
serves to ensure uniformity among the states in the area of foreign trade); see also Spiro, supra note 6, at 839
(commenting that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause "was conceived to protect all states from international
retaliation provoked by the actions of one").
184. See Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 147 (finding that courts are ill-equipped to
determine national trade measures and arguing that Congress should explicitly determine the parameters of foreign
trade).
185. Id.
186. See Dreifke, supra note 14, at 283 (surmising that international retaliation should not invalidate per se
state legislation).
187. See Altbach, supra note 27, at 2 (reporting that the European Community and Japan have requested
World Trade Organization consultations with the United States, charging that the law violates the Uruguay Round's
government procurement agreement, which Massachusetts and thirty-six other states voluntarily pledged to uphold).
188. See Frey, supra note 48, at 187-88 (flushing out the variables that businesses commonly evaluate in
determining whether to remain involved with a nation that has a questionable human rights record).
189. See STONE, supra note 3, at 243 (detailing that state legislatures are motivated to generate greater
revenues and protections for their respective populaces); see also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984) (discussing the basis supporting the market participant exception to the commerce clause
including the need for states to apportion their funds as they deem appropriate).
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foreign companies which the foreign commerce clause did not envision.'9
Essentially, such restrictions force the state to contract in an inefficient manner.
Interestingly, many scholars and courts submit that discrimination against foreign
companies may sometimes serve the interests of the United States by protecting
domestic industries, raising revenues for state governments, protecting against
dumping, and retaliating against trade barriers in foreign countries.19' Indeed,
federal trade policy often outwardly discriminates against foreign commerce.
92
Therefore, the policy of providing foreign commerce with greater protections
counters many pragmatic political and economic goals of regulating commerce.
B. The Market Participant Doctrine
Notwithstanding the questions raised over the standard applied to laws
infringing on foreign commerce,193 the market participation exception1 94 probably
insulates state selective contract laws with companies doing business in Burma.
195
The Supreme Court first enunciated the market participant rule in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap.196 The case involved a Maryland subsidy program designed to
encourage the recycling of abandoned cars, but which imposed stricter requirements
on out-of-state firms for establishing good title. 97 The law's natural implications
produced a precipitate decline in the number of abandoned cars delivered to out-of-
state producers 8 Speaking for the court, Justice Powell explained that, "Maryland
190. See Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 147 (commenting that preventing states from
deciding with whom they will contract did not serve as the Framers' premise for creating the foreign commerce
clause).
191. See id. at 147 n.56 (citing RICHARD POMFRET, INTERNATtONALTRADE 122-45, 188-92 (1982) who put
forth several arguments in support of national trade barriers and discriminatory trade policies).
192. See id at 147 n.57 (noting that protectionist policies are often enacted through customs duties, anti-
dumping laws, subsidies to domestic enterprises, and regulation of foreign investment).
193. See supra notes 159-92 (discussing the lessened scrutiny afforded foreign commerce infringements
under Commerce Clause analysis); see also Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 145 (suggesting
that foreign corporations have less Commerce Clause protection than domestic corporations, thereby intimating that
foreign-based multinational corporations in international commerce should not be protected by the dormant
Commerce Clause at all).
194. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794.810 (1976) (embracing the market participant rule,
which allows states to participate in the market without the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause); see also
Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Exemption to the Dormazt Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV.
395,400-01 (1989) (elucidating that the market participant rule evolved from Commerce Clause decisions to protect
state activity when the state acts as a contractual partner in the market rather than as a regulator).
195. See Thomas A. Troyer, et al., Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for
Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions and Pension Funds. 74 GEo. L.J. 127, 160 (1985) (concluding that if
the Court confronted a divestment issue, it would apply the market participant exception). But see Schmahmann
& Finch, supra note 24, at 191-92 (construing the market participant doctrine as ineffectual for laws in the foreign
commerce context, because the market participation doctrine has never been applied to a case involving foreign
commerce and that the doctrine unduly hampers the economic relationships of the state's trading partners).
196. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
197. Id. at 796.
198. Id. at 797.
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entered the market for the purpose... of protecting the State's environment. As the
means of furthering this purpose, it elected the payment of state funds-in the form
of bounties-to encourage the removal of automobile hulks from Maryland streets
and junkyards. But no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause,
impedes their movement out of state."'199 He went on to announce that "[N]othing
in the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of Congressional action,
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others.
'200
The doctrine's outlines received further refinement in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc.20t In that case, the Court considered a
municipal law that required all construction projects funded in whole or in part by
the city to be performed by a crew of at least one-half Boston residents.0 2 The
Court upheld the order because it did not "reach beyond the immediate parties with
which the government transacts business. ' '203 The Court determined that the order
affected only those working for the city and thus those individuals were receiving
city funds and the program constituted direct state participation in the market.204
The Court concluded that Boston's hiring rule constituted "market participation,"
even though, as correctly pointed out, it "imposed restrictions that reach beyond the
immediate parties with which the government transacts business. 2 5
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,206 the Court struck
down for the first time a law that involved state proprietary activity. The case invol-
ved a requirement that Alaskan owned timber be processed within the state after
purchase.0 7 The Court agreed with the conclusion that the State could not use its
leverage in the timber market to exert a regulatory effect on the market.08
Obligating the purchaser of the timber to contract with another party was
antithetical to having the state act as a market participant and not a regulator.209 The
Court emphasized that controlling the post-purchase behavior of its trading partners
goes beyond the parties' direct commercial obligations, and held that the market
participant doctrine does not immunize downstream regulation of the timber-
processing market in which the state is not a participant.10
199. Id. at 809-10.
200. Id. at 810.
201. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
202. Id. at 206.
203. Id. at211 n.7.
204. Id. at 214-15.
205. Coenen, supra note 194, at 402.
206. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
207. Id. at 84.
208. Id. at 98.
209. Id. at 96-97.
210. Id. at 96.
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Language in Wunnicke supports placing local debarment enactments under the
penumbra of the market-participant doctrine.211 The doctrine permits a State to
influence
a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which it is a major
participant .... [but] the doctrine does not give carte blanche to impose any
conditions that the State has the economic power to dictate, and does not
validate any requirement merely because the State imposes it upon
someone with whom it is in contractual privity.
21 2
The debarment laws do not attempt to impose any requirements on international
companies outside of contractual privity.213 The state merely is exercising its
selectivity in choosing economic partners, a privilege certainly within its pur-
view.14 All companies can continue to contract with whomever they wish, and the
state laws do not condemn nor preclude them from exercising their economic
choice.215 Moreover, by not including a further requirement that the company
perform services with another selected company or country, the state does not over-
reach the doctrine's limits illustrated in Wunnicke.
In a recent decision concerning the market participant doctrine, New Energy Co.
v. Limbach,216 the Court declined to authorize a state action through the market
participant doctrine. The case involved an Ohio statute designed to encourage pro-
duction and use of gasohol, a motor vehicle fuel made by mixing gasoline and a
grain derivative, ethanol.21 7 Ohio provided a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol
sold against the fuel tax otherwise payable on gasoline and gasohol sales. 28 Ohio
refused to allow credit for ethanol produced in states, including Indiana, which did
not afford a similar tax credit for Ohio-produced ethanol, thereby overtly dis-
criminating against out-of-state users of ethanol. 219 The Court held that "taxing is
a primeval governmental activity" 220 and that the Ohio tax credit "cannot plausibly
211. But see Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 194 (averring that the Wunnicke court would oppose
allowing market-participant immunity for local debarment statutes).
212. Id. at 97.
213. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (explaining that restrictions on downstream purchases
preclude use of the market participant exception).
214. See White, 460 U.S. at 205-06 (explaining that when a state purchases items then the state receives
greater protection); Reeves Inc., v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (propounding that when a state sells items, the
state can determine to sell to its residents first); Alexandria Scrap. 426 U.S. at 810 (standing for the proposition that
a State acting in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser or seller may favor its citizens over others).
215. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 82.
216. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
217. Id. at 271.
218. Id. at 272.
219. Id. at 273.
220. Id. at 277.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
be analogized to the activity of a private purchaser." 22t Thus, the market participant
exception did not immunize the Ohio statute.
The highlighted activity that the selective contract statutes focus on concerns
state involvement in a contract for goods or services. This scenario, distinguishes
itself from the tax credit of Limbach because selecting contractual partners is a
function engaged in by private groups, unlike the government's monopoly on the
taxing power.' Furthermore, the discrimination between the states that animated
Limbach does not undercut the contractual debarment statutes because they pertain
to foreign nations.22 Therefore, the statutes will not directly incite discriminatory
or protectionist actions by other states.224
The series of decisions defining the market participation exception reveals that
the exemption does not exist for governmental entities engaged in activities that
private citizens could not.225 However, if the state engages in activities which a
private citizen could partake, such as deciding with whom to contract, then the mar-
ket participant exception appliesY26 Further strength for using the market participant
exception for contractual debarment statutes derives from the justifications for the
rule.227 First, the doctrine reflects the Court's concern for state sovereignty.2 8
Second, the doctrine protects a state's ability to choose its trading partners without
judicial interference. 2 9 Finally, the doctrine embodies the judicial branch's abhor-
rence for policing the diverse activities undertaken by a state in its proprietary
capacity."
221. Id. at 278.
222. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,544 (1983) (viewing a tax exemption as a
form of governmental spending within Congress's purview).
223. See Bilder, supra note I, at 831 (describing the negligible probability that nations would react by
limiting trade against a state for not wanting to trade with companies affiliated with a despotic regime).
224. Leading Cases Constitutional Law, supra note 169, at 147.
225. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1607 (1997) (refusing to
expand the market participant exception to an action by the State in its sovereign capacity); see also Coenen, supra
note 194, at 404 (explaining that government purchasing in of a contractual setting should enjoy the exemption).
226. See Camps Newfound, 117 S. Ct. at 1607 (determining that state entry into the market in a proprietary
fashion manifests the prototypical use for the market participant exception); see also Coenen, supra note 194, at
404 (postulating that the availability of the market participant exception for state activities involving purchasing
and contracting should generally be available).
227. See Coenen, supra note 194, at 400 (averring that the market participant doctrine evolved to afford
protections for state preferences, when the state is engaged in a proprietary function, of local interests).
228. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438; see GSW, Inc. v. Long City, 999 F.2d 1508, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1993) (considering
the extent of the market participant doctrine and its limitations); see also Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 830
F.2d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1987) (lamenting thejudiciary's inability to distinguish between a "market regulator and
a market participant").
229. See H. Christopher Boehning, Northern Enclosure: State Preference Statute Guiding Local Government
Purchasing Practices Qualifies for Immunity Under Market Participant Doctrine, 71 WAsH. U. L.Q. 455, 465
(1993) (analyzing the purposes supporting the market-participant doctrine and surmising that activities engaged in
by an arm of the state, for example, a school, also deserved protection via market participation, but only if the
immunity is extended for states acting in their proprietary capacity).
230. Id.
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Upholding laws restricting the extension of contracts to Burma fosters all of
these goals. Quintessentially, state sovereignty requires the ability to enter into con-
tracts and to determine how and where to spend state money.23' Inextricably linked
with this concept are the "benefits that derive from meaningful and responsive local
government, including increased participatory democracy and greater sensitivity to
local concerns. 232 Allowing democratic processes to dictate how states will engage
the market, through elections and voting on referenda, exemplifies the archetypal
Jeffersonian citizen influence manifested in enacting legislation on the local
level. 3 Devoid of this ability, the few people actively participating in politics
would likely dwindle still further if courts squash these laws under the heavy stone
of the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the policies behind the market participant
doctrine fully support local contractual debarment measures.
VI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
"The foreign policy of the United States has been reserved to the federal
government, and the Supreme Court has looked askance at state actions impinging
on the exercise of foreign relations powers."' This concern emanates from the
desire to have the United States "speak with one voice" in matters of foreign
policy.2 5 Without such a paradigm, the United States could confuse foreign nations
and, concomitantly, generate global animosity
3 6
Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the "Laws
of the United States;... and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, Under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. 237 Most
academics have concluded that foreign policy remains thepurview of the federal
government, 238 largely because the Constitution expressly forbids any State to
"enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation, 239 or "enter into any Agreement
231. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439.
232. SeeJubinsky, supra note 11, at 561 (explaining that the local nature of state management of state-owned
resources should not fall within the federal government's authority).
233. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 177 (determining that legislative decisions arrived at through democratic
conduits deserve judicial protection).
234. Fenton, supra note 4, at 573.
235. Id. at 576; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 306 (1936) (stating that the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation, appearing to contradict the
Constitution's division of foreign affairs powers between both Congress and the President); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (illustrating that our system of government is such that the interest of cities, counties and
states imperatively requires that federal power concerning foreign relations remain singularly free from local
interference).
236. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (finding, as a concern, that in the realm of foreign relations, the
United States' policy requires responsibility and meaning not to impair the unity of design).
237. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
238. See HENKIN, supra note 31, at 241 (concluding that the United States Constitution has an engrafted
presumption that foreign affairs powers belong solely to the national government).
239. U.S. CONST. art. L § 10.
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or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War."'2 40
Notwithstanding the Constitution's limits, national power has never eclipsed all
state activity in the realm of foreign affairs.2 41 Almost daily states act in ways that
indirectly affect foreign governments, international trade organizations, and trans-
242national companies. For example, a State could ditermine that only particular
types of tomatoes, free of a particular pesticide, qualify as acceptable produce for
state purchase.243 While obviously this statute might have domestic impact, the
impact likely would also affect, perhaps detrimentally, nearby trading partners,
Canada and Mexico.244 This law, therefore, could compel both nations to reconsider
their present growing techniques and pesticide treatments in hopes of conformance
with the law.245 These changes emanate directly from state activity, but this activity
is not an invalid state intrusion into foreign affairs.246 If not the pesticide hypo-
thetical, the "political decision" of Florida to accept or deny refugees from Cuba or
Haiti also serves as an example of valid state legislative decision making.247
240. Id. at cl. 3.
241. See HENKIN, supra note 31, at 244 (describing several instances of state involvement in foreign affairs,
such as engaging in trade with aliens inside its borders); see also General Elec. Co. v. State Assembly Comm'n,
425 F. Supp. 909, 915 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) (declining to block the inquiry into corporations' cooperation with Arab
boycott of Israel); Godstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (validating a nonresident alien
inheritance statute); Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725,728 (D. Mont. 1968) (denying injunction against enforcement
of Montana statute that limited alien inheritance); Troyer et al., supra note 195, at 159 n.123 (explaining that state
courts have upheld laws affecting foreign affairs).
242. FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 288.852, 288.853 (West Supp. 1998) (urging Washington to forego economic and
political relations with Cuba until the island nation sponsors democratic elections); Greg N. Anderson, Comment,
Achieving United States-Canadian Reciprocity in Sub-National Government Federalism and the Canadian-United
States Free Trade Agreement, Procurement: Federalism and the United States and Canada Free Trade Agreement,
4 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 131, 151-52 (citing Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d
Cir. 1990), for the proposition that laws that do not adversely affect the central government's ability to deal with
difficulties on an international level do not qualify as unconstitutional state involvement in foreign affairs). But see
Troyer et al., supra note 195, at 158 n. 119 (citing New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n, 41 N.Y.2d
345, 351-52, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (1977), striking down the City's ban on advertisements
for employment in South Africa as improper invasion of federal power over foreign policy).
243. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (analyzing California law
limiting avocado purchases to those having only 5% oil content, hence unavoidably circumscribing the number
purchased from other states and nations).
244. See Kenneth J. Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with International Trade
Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 143, 167-68 (1993) (hinting that national trade
agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffand Trade (GATT) and the recent North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) have eliminated some of the potential areas of contention by limiting states ability to legislate
concerning foreign commerce, but noting that Buy-American Laws still strain international relationships).
245. id. at 167 (determining that having states come to agreement to eliminate state procurement laws has
proven difficult).
246. See Neret & Valladares, supra note 32, at 215 (discussing both state buy-American statutes and buy
local statutes and concluding that the "same market participant logic" which protects those laws should also shield
Florida's International Act that encourages Floridian products and restricts its government agencies to invest in only
Florida-origin products or services). See generally Trojan Techs. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990)
(concluding that Pennsylvania's buy-American statute did not intrude into foreign affairs).
247. See generally Garcia-Mir v. Meese 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (upholding the detention of Cuban
refugees in violation of customary international law).
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Analogously, determining that foregoing trade with foreign and domestic
companies unduly shocks foreign affairs essentially precludes states from creating
legislation that tangentially affects foreign nations.248 Obviously, with greater world
interdependence, such a determination would make laws affecting others outside
America's borders go the way of the dodo to society's detriment.249
In the area of foreign affairs, Supremacy Clause analysis begins with a require-
ment that a local action have a legitimate local purpose and that its effects must be
incidental "on a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject." ' 0 The reasoning behind this construction makes sense: "If state action could
defeat or alter national foreign policy, serious consequences might ensue. The
nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties with a
foreign power." t
With a dearth of cases on point, the leading decision, Zschering v. Miller. 2 pro-
vides the canvas to critique state involvement in foreign affairs. The Oregon in-
heritance law in question compelled Oregon courts to determine whether the
Czechoslovakian government granted residents enforceable property rights in
inherited property or engaged in any form of confiscation. z3 The law's unspoken
purpose focused on trying to deprive communist nations from acquiring American
property.' This process required courts to judge the veracity of diplomatic state-
ments regarding property rights in certain communist nations and to speculate about
the political nature of those governments.25' The Court held that "the foreign policy
attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war' and the like are the real
248. Itel Containers Int'l v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60,74-75 (1993) (refusing to adhere to Itel's initial position
that any aggregated domestic tax would unduly impinge on international companies and, thus, foreign affairs).
249. See Cooper, supra note 244, at 168 (noting that states have little incentive to voluntarily relinquish their
control over state procurement policy because they would receive little benefit to compensate them for their lose
of autonomy ); see also Neret & Valladares, supra note 32, at 214 (emphasizing the multifaceted purposes behind
states engaging in foreign affairs including the raising of public consciousness concerning foreign affairs).
250. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,70
n.28 (1941)); see Banco de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (discussing Congress's preeminent
position concerning sensitive foreign affairs issues); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (B. Wright
ed. 1961) (writing that States must accede their authority to control of foreign affairs to the central government);
Fenton, supra note 4, at 589-90 (calculating that the plethora of laws that effect a change in policy by the foreign
state impermissibly impinge on Washington's ability to create foreign policy).
251. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942). Butsee Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480,493 (1983) (explaining that many foreign policy decisions concern "actions ... in our courts [that] raise
sensitive issues concerning foreign relations" and implying that there are non-sensitive issues that do not implicate
foreign relations).
252. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
253. Id. at 430-31.
254. See Fenton, supra note 4, at 588-89 (noting that the law in Zschering required a state to sit in judgment
over foreign nations a purpose that has been determined to be illegitimate).
255. Zschering, 389 U.S. 435-36.; see Troyer et al., supra note 195, at 159 (detailing that the fatal flaw in
the administration of the Oregon nonresident inheritance statute was not that the state law touched on foreign
affairs, but itfailed because it mandated detailed, case-by-case judicial inquiries into foreign government practices).
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desiderata... and these matters are for the federal government, not for the local
probate courts."5 6 Therefore, the necessity for constant judicial scrutiny of foreign
legal and economic structure made the Oregon statute infirm because of a con-
stitutional foreign affairs breach.
To distinguish between the unconstitutional inheritance statute of Zschering,
and the contractual debarment provisions at issue, involves three considerations.
First, the action challenged in Zschering had a direct impact on foreign citizens
because it dealt with Oregon mandating repeated judicial inquiries of the rights of
Czechoslovakian citizens and the type of government in Czechoslovakia.257 The
main repercussion of the selective contract law, in contrast, falls on firms con-
tracting with Burma, and thus it does not directly implicate the legislatively created
rights of the Burmese citizenry." Further, the statutes require only one evaluation
by a governmental entity to determine if the state can contract with a particular
company.as 9 This assessment will only require a determination that improper treat-
ment of Burmese citizens has ceased, a much less arbitrary process than judicial
evaluation of communist government treatment of property. 260 Human rights vio-
lations caused by unjustified killings and state sanctioned torture do not require
thorough evaluation of Burmese law because they occur without any legal com-
mand, in contrast to the legal foundation that supported the land confiscation of
Zschering.
The second factor differentiating the local provisions from the Zschering
holding springs from the fact that the debarment laws minimally impact foreign
affairs26 and that they reflect legitimate local interests and concerns regarding the
appropriate disposition of state funds.2 62 Although escaping precise calculation, the
predicted monetary loss Burma could suffer likely would not approach the funds
256. Zschering, 389 U.S. at 437-38.
257. Id. at 436.
258. See Fenton, supra note 4, at 589 (providing a foil to compare the impact of divestment provisions on
the rights of South African citizens with the debarment question under consideration here).
259. See Troyer et al., supra note 195, at 159 (positing that a single, general decision by a state mandating
the divestment of state funds arguably would be beyond the scope of Zschering, and thus, it could be implied that
a state assessment of Burma's human rights record might also survive).
260. See Spiro, supra note 6, at 844 (commenting that the decision in Zschering hinged on the determination
that state courts were passing judgment on the political orientation of other nations).
261. Compare Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore 562 A.2d 720, 747 (1989) (holding that divestment
legislation had a minimal impact on South Africa and thus did not constitute more than an incidental involvement
in foreign affairs), with Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 24, at 198-99 (elucidating that debarment laws exemplify
inordinate state involvement in foreign affairs).
262. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 830-31 (analyzing probable arguments to substantiate local laws such as
divestment legislation and concluding that these laws should survive constitutional scrutiny). But see Spiro, supra
note 6, at 833 (worrying that states and the judiciary lack the foreign affairs expertise to legislate and determine the
efficacy of that legislation).
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that the various divestment laws withdrew from South Africa.263 Further, the
"walking on egg-shells" concern that the court espoused in Zschering has no
bearing on the Burmese provision. With the cold war a mere historical afterthought,
the concern for escalating bad relations between East and West that colored
Zschering does not influence relations with Burma. Moreover, these concerns relate
to issues on which Congress, with full knowledge of the existence of these laws, did
not take preemptive action, thus implying that the laws do not impermissibly
intrude upon the federal foreign relations power.2 4 Withholding private monies
from bequeathed relatives also differs from selective contract laws because, through
the selective contract laws, the state determines how to allocate its resources
through contracts, but does not prevent individuals from obtaining vested rights.
Third, and finally, the selective contract laws concern the conduct of companies
in which the respective State or city actors might contract. 265 Evidently, the
Supreme Court's main concern in Zschering focused on judicial evaluation of com-
munist property law. Contrariwise, while the selective contract laws protect against
contracts that offend the moralities of state citizens, they do not require meticulous
assessment of Burmese law.2  These facts make the case more closely resemble the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold California's alien inheritance statute in Clark
v. Allen.267 In Allen, the Court explained that the alien inheritance statute did not
constitute making a compact with another nation.268 Moreover, the evaluation of
German law had only "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.
2 69
Similarly, determining that egregious human rights violations continue does not
require scrutinizing Burmese law. Therefore, the selective contract laws fit within
the confines of appropriate state action.
263. See Spiro, supra note 6, at 817 (cataloging the billions of dollars withdrawn from banks and investments
in South African companies); see also CALAB 888 1997 (allowing existing contracts to continue without penalty);
Miller, supra note 24, at II (reporting that Unocal has the rights to develop an extremely lucrative oil pipeline in
Burma).
264. See Bilder, supra note 1, at 831 (determining that local involvement through divestment or debarment
laws likely would pass constitutional muster). See generally Barclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298 (1994) (deciding that Congress's silence reflects acquiescence toward state action).
265. See David M. Billings, Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 568, 571 (citing the court in Trustees as discerning that judicial inquiry into actual administration of
foreign law was unacceptable).
266. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7 § 22J(b) (West Supp. 1997) (generating the list of companies that
cannot contract with the Massachusetts government from sources such as the United Nations and other "reliable
sources," thus obviating the need for the Massachusetts to consider the Burmese law).
267. 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (concerning a statute allowing a nonresident alien to inherit personal property only
if, under the laws of the alien's nation. U.S. citizens had a reciprocal right to inherit personal property on the same
terms and conditions as the alien's fellow citizens); see Jubinsky, supra note 11, at 570 (highlighting that Clark
survives the later Zschering holding).
268. Id. at 517.
269. Id.
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Other commentators counter that courts would not or should not ° review state
laws interfering with the foreign affairs power by considering their success in
implementing the policies they have adopted.27 However, logically, a state law that
peripherally affects foreign affairs lessens the likelihood that the law will provoke
a foreign relations challenge.2 2 In addition, because of their proliferation and
popular acceptance, it is less likely that these laws will receive a political or judicial
challenge.2 3 Accordingly, Congress might "feel the pressure" to diplomatically
remain silent because of the local influence supporting the selective contract
laws.274 Although a concern for foreign policy balkanization exists because of
greater potential for smaller groups to capture local politics and to force through
legislation supporting their position, this concern does not supervene the goal of
defending freedom of speech for governmental entities to influence Washington's
decision making.2 5 This harmony of local voices to strive for laws protecting and
furthering local interests serves as the archetype of republican democracy:
attempting to impact legislation through voicing a political opinion.2 6 Abrogating
this mechanism not only stifles a First Amendment prerogative, but also vitiates the
270. See Fenton, supra note 4. at 590 (criticizing the court in Mayor of Baltimore for holding the negligible
economic impact Baltimore's divestment law had on South Africa as determinative that the law did not adversely
affect or implicate foreign relations); see also Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(proclaiming that foreign affairs matters have been seen as a matter for which the judiciary has "neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong to the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry").
271. See Fenton, supra note 4, at 590 (concluding that because the constitution reserves foreign affairs power
entirely in the national government, the Supreme Court would not validate or invalidate the laws through the use
of an empirical scale to calculate their effectiveness); Zschering, 389 U.S. at 434 (noting that the Court offered little
incidence of interference with foreign relations and rejected the argument put forth in government amicus curiae
in support of the bill because of its incidental impact on foreign affairs).
272. See Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 747(attributing great weight to the fact that the divestment policy
did not have a large monetary impact on South Africa as determinative that the policy did not impinge on the
national foreign affairs power); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194-95 (recognizing that some categories of state
action fall short of interfering with foreign affairs through multiple taxation of foreign commerce). Butsee Altbach,
supra note 27, at 3 (illustrating that Engage-USA, a corporate protection group, has begun deliberation in how to
attack the nascent state legislation using a foreign affairs argument).
273. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.. 299 U.S. 304,329 (1936) (discounting a court's ability
to effectively resolve inquiries involving foreign affairs, an area that has a settled jurisprudence); see also Shuman,
supra note 8, at 172-75 (emphasizing the density and popularity of the legislation making it unlikely to be
challenged through political means because doing so would garner unwanted citizen rancor, hinder reelections, or
damage party politics).
274. See Cooper, supra note 244, at 169 (noting that federal officials often defer to states to avoid political
fallout concerning local endeavors in foreign affairs); see also Altbach, supra note 27, at 3 (illustrating that
President Clinton, vicariously through Trade Representative Barchefsky, supports Massachusetts' selective-contract
statute).
275. See generally Shuttlesworth v. Alabama, 394 U.S. 147 (1968) (determining that the First Amendment
was especially made for peaceful protest against governmental action or inaction); see also supra Part In
(discussing the importance ofmaintaining open channels ofcommunication to accentuate a thorough trade in ideas).
276. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 177 (determining that it would be ludicrous to prohibit states and cities
from acting in all areas touching on affairs of foreign nations because that implicitly means curbing the American
core values of speech, protest and assembly).
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fundamental feature of a federal democratic government: allowing locally elected
officials to determine local governmental policy.
277
VII. CONCLUSION: IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT FOR
FEDERALISM To FUNCTION PROPERLY
State sovereignty and the ability to determine beneficial spending policies have
become secondary to the federal government's objective of promoting free trade.278
Global trade agreements such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and regional ones such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), symbolize the difficulty of maintaining state autonomy to conduct trade
and regulate its interests. 279 For example, national agreements create restrictions
with which states must comply.20 This difficulty in protecting states rights in the
international arena has also increased the difficulty of protecting fundamental
human rights28tas defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
282
Requiring states to interact with companies engaged with nations violating human
rights undermines the Declaration's goals. 283 Further, negating laws that seek to pro-
tect fundamental human rights under the guise of unconstitutionality would counter
a trend of greater deference toward state activity in this arena.284 This process would
277. Herrman, supra note 87, at 1167.
278. See AJ. Tagemann, Comment, NAFTA and the Changing Role of State Government in a Global
Economy: Willthe NAFTA Federal-State Consultation Process Preserve State Sovereignty?, 20 SEATrLEU. L. REV.
243, 243 (1996) (arguing that eroding state power over decisions concerning local trade has left the national
government able to promote free trade by eclipsing individual state government involvement in international trade
policy); see also Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future In A Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1994)
(thinking that federalism has become a non-factor in making international agreements, to the detriment of state
autonomy).
279. See Samuel C. Straight, GATTand NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty
of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE LJ. 261, 261 (1995) (asserting that the dispute resolution mechanism under the
international trade agreement coupled with the federal government's commitment to enforce NAFIA obligations
created fears of lost state sovereignty).
280. See Anderson, supra note 242, at 131-32 (discussing several states' displeasure at becoming an observer
in the dismantlement of state laws for the creation of free trade zones); see also Altbach, supra note 27, at 2
(recounting the European Community's decision to file a complaint against Massachusetts' selective-contract law
because of alleged violations of Article XXIII of GATT, which protects against the nullification or reduction of
benefits of a signatory by another nation).
281. See Frey, supra note 48, at 153 (considering the complexity of complying with international human
rights law because of the variegated methods of treatment people receive by their own governments around the
world).
282. HUMANRtGHTsANDSOC[ALWORK 15(1994) (citing Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
283. See id. (discussing generally the basic rules and freedoms of all peoples covering civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights).
284. See Shuman, supra note 1, at 174-75 (assessing the increased state involvement in the realm of
protecting human rights).
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also circumvent the legal mechanisms illustrated by GATT,285 which makes it in-
cumbent upon federal actors to remove incongruous state law.2  One scholar notes
that professor Tribe ascribes the duty to the federal government to choose between
two alternatives: (1) either preempt the state law; or (2) bring an action against the
state and persuade a court to strike the law down under GATT.28 7 Neither has occur-
red here, as evidenced by the strong support the Massachusetts selective contract
law received by United States Trade Representative Barshefsky in discussions at the
WTO. 8 Ironically, by declaring selective contract laws unconstitutional, the United
States would create more international second-guessing by not adhering to inter-
national agreements that have existing methods to resolve issues that potentially
implicate international concerns. By not adhering to GAIT rules, the United States
cheapens GATT's force and damages the delicate structure that has taken so much
time to create.289 Hence, the constitutional challenge that selective contract laws
unduly impinge on foreign affairs by generating international anger loses its vigor
if the GATT mechanism possesses a remedy to solve the problem but does not
provide the chosen solution.
Requiring Americans to act in unison where conflicting local laws endanger
U.S. welfare and where national expertise offers the unique method to satisfy these
concerns seems laudable. 290 Congress maintains the ability to control war funding
and the procurement of money necessary for nuclear weapon creation and Congress
can act to forbid local initiatives in contravention of promulgated policies. 29 In the
case of selective contract laws, which only tangentially affect foreign affairs, im-
posing this ideal of unison epitomizes the difficulty of forcing a square peg into a
round hole. States should control their monetary outlays and contracts as part and
parcel to the goal of federalism.292 Precluding states in this manner would impair
local policymaking and undermine the role of the locality as a laboratory of experi-
ment to create laws that speak to the national conscience.293 This restriction on the
285. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465. 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as 19 U.S.C.
3511 (West Supp. 1997)).
286. See Straight, supra note 279, at 244 (citing GA7TImplementing Legislation: Hearings on S. 2467Before
the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong. 296(1994) which includes the prepared
statement of Laurence Tribe Professor of Law, Harvard University).
287. Id. at 244.
288. See Altbach. supra note 27, at 1 (illustrating the White House's decision to support Massachusetts'
selective contract law).
289. Straight, supra note 279, at 244-46 (noting that neglecting the procedures in place for GATT would
essentially make it a nullity).
290. Shuman, supra note 8, at 177.
291. Id.; see also Denis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism's Failure: Subsidiariy in the European Union, 44
AM. J. CoMp. L. 537, 564-65 (1996) (struggling to define the scope and purpose of the Tenth Amendment against
the backdrop of the expansion of the federal government).
292. See Shuman, supra note 8, at 176-77 (underscoring that many activities engaged in by state governments
will have some impact on foreign affairs, but this should not prevent states from engaging in this activity).
293. Bilder, supra note 1, at 828-29; see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (demonstrating the importance given to
speech concerning public issues).
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states would also gag state governments by silencing them before taking action that
implicates foreign policy, because many state activities "are not intended to, and do
not, have any direct or significant adverse impact on foreign governments or their
citizens. 294 Because of pervasive global interdependence, local policymakers would
now be forced to agonize over every local action that might impact international
affairs. 295 To strike down laws that promote the vocalization of concerns for the
maltreatment of people effectively muffles two-thirds of government and obviates
the First Amendment.296 Also, the existing contradiction of holding companies
liable for involvement with governments guilty of heinous acts against their own
populace while prohibiting state law that would prevent contracting with those
nations and those companies would be eliminated.297
If Congress specifically regulates this area, then Congress accepts the
accountability for enacting law that contravenes local wishes, and in the process
supervenes local measures. 298 But without this definitive statement, leaving it to the
judiciary, the least democratic branch, seems a haphazard way to solve concerns
over national foreign policy.299 "If the judiciary comes to respect the original inten-
tions of the Founding Fathers, the country can enjoy all the virtues of a strong
national foreign policy as well as the benefits of local innovation. ' 3°
Congress should make a determination to calibrate the degree local laws can
extend in this area. If Congress fails to legislate with sufficient clarity, the prin-
ciples of federalism should serve to protect state selective contract laws. State
debarment measures exemplify the benefits of allowing local policymakers to
legislate. The ability to formulate novel methodologies to solve pressing problems
receives enhancement by having numerous policymakers: The idea that two heads,
in this case three heads, including states and municipalities, are better than one.
The state measures exemplify the purpose of having a federal government to
promote a polyglot approach to issues that concern local populaces. The laws do not
294. Bilder, supra note 1, at 828.
295. See Straight, supra note 279, at 216 n.3 (ferreting out ninety-seven preferential trade agreements
between various nations established under Article XXIV of GATT, including the European Economic Community,
the African Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Association, and the Israel-United States Free Trade
Agreement); see also GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GAT LAW AND PRACTICE Article XXIV- 4243
(making states adhere to exceedingly specific regulations such as limitations on selling gold coins).
296. Bilder, supra note 1, at 829; see Shuman, supra note 8, at 177 (discussing the important values ofprotest
and assembly as two of the premises that support municipalities creating legislation that influences Washington).
297. See Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 883,898 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (allowing claims under the Alien Tort
Claims Act to go forward against Unocal and Total for their funding of SLORC's clearance of jungle for an oil
pipeline, thereby causing the displacement of thousands of Burmese).
298. Troyeretal., supra note 195, at 160 (hypothesizing that, if it wished, Congress could prevent states from
adopting divestment policies even for their own funds); see generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding federal wage and hour legislation as applied to municipal employees, indicating
the pervasive authority of Congress to supervene state laws to the contrary).
299. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 23 (2d ed. 1986).
300. Shuman, supra note 8, at 177.
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represent a serious challenge to federal control in the areas of foreign commerce or
foreign affairs. Further, the latest actions by the President and Congress deciding
not to eradicate state law demonstrates federal acquiescence to selective contract
laws. Of course, Congress and the President maintain the ability to strike down
these measures should they become excessively onerous. Nevertheless, in the
absence of this definitive action, to prohibit state activity in this area ostensibly
makes states marionettes entirely dependent on federal actors, an idea disapproved
of in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 30' Lastly, our brand of federalism was
designed to promote the flow of ideas and especially ideas concerning political or
public matters of concern both horizontally, among the several states, and vertically
from state to federal government and vice-versa. Striking down these laws on con-
stitutional grounds does an ironic injustice to the Framers' goals.
301. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) (declaring that the federal government
lacks exclusive control over interstate commerce).

